THAT SPACE Is Neceſſary BEING.

THAT SPACE Is Neceſſary BEING: WITH THE HISTORY OF NOTHING.

HAVING

Premiſed to it the *Whole Contents*

OF HIS

Philoſophical CREED,

Of which

This is one ARTICLE.

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LONDON:

Printed for J. ROBERTS, in *Warwick-Lane.*

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TO THE

READER.

THE following Treatiſe *is intended only as a* Specimen, *being but a Part of a Larger Work, whoſe Deſign is to repreſent the ill State of our* Fundamental Knowledge, *and to expoſe the preſent Principles of our* Philoſophy, *and to reform them, be reducing them to a* Conformity *to* natural Senſe *and* Di-

vine Revelation, *and to repreſent the Neceſſity of ſuch* Reformation *to the ſerious Conſideration of the* Chriſtian World, *and Lovers of Truth.*

The particular Subjects of the ſeveral Parts *of the aforeſaid* WORK, *are as follow.*

The *INTRODUCTION*;

Shewing from ſeveral Texts of the SCRIPTURES laid in as Cautions againſt *Philoſophy*, and particularly *Metaphyſicks*; how great Reaſon we have to ſuſpect it to be One, and a great, Cauſe of *Atheiſm*, *Infidelity* and *Hereſy*.

BOOK I.

BOOK I.

Expoſes the Vanity of *Metaphyſicks*; the Name and Nature of that Science.

BOOK II.

Of Life and Conſciouſneſs; and examines the Reaſons of our Confinement of them, to Spiritual Subſtance, and Animal Syſtems only.

BOOK III.

Of the Nature of Knowledge, and that Knowledge is ſubſtantial Penetration.

BOOK IV.

Of the end of Knowledge, that it is Self-preſervation, and that all Knowledge is Relative only, and none Abſolute.

BOOK V.

BOOK V.

Of the Objects of Knowledge or *Real Being*, and *that Space is neceſſary Being*; and the Subject of the *Divine Attributes*, the Branch that is here offer'd.

BOOK VI.

Of Objective States, or the different Forms of Propoſition of Objects to the Mind, *Real*, *Ideal*, and *Symbolical*.

BOOK VII.

Of the Subject of Knowledge, or the Nature of the Soul, that it is an incorporeal Fluid.

THE

THAT

SPACE

Is Neceſſary

BEING,

And the SUBJECT of the

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

OUR Philoſophy has been always in Extremes; the preſent reigning, metaphyſical Hypotheſis, or that of the In-corporealiſts, is as much too refined and ſpeculative, as that of the Corporealiſts was too groſs; and 'tis carried to a Height of Subtilty that makes it as ridiculous as the others Rudeneſs, in its State of primitive Barbarity. The old Corporealiſts were Men of Senſe without Reaſon, and their metaphyſi-

cal Succeſſors are no leſs Men of Reaſon, beyond all Senſe. The Idolatrous Miſapplication of the Divine Attributes, under the corporeal Hypotheſis to improper Subjects, was the firſt Foundation of Atheiſm, for the Wretches that would be Atheiſts, and pretend ſo to be, are ſo *ex Hypotheſi* only, and by miſrepreſenting to themſelves, the Divine Being, ſpeak rightly, and rationally, againſt ſuch Subject of the Divine Attributes which they have in View perhaps, but 'tis but ſome Creature all the while of their own Brain, ſome Idol of their own Imagination, and not the true Object, that under ſome obnoxious Character they attempt to demoliſh, and from their own falſely ſuppoſed *quid fit*, argue back, and reſolve the *Queſtion* of the *an fit* of God.

But as the corporeal Hypotheſis, by Miſapplication of the Divine Attributes to improper and incapable Subjects, led Men to Atheiſm; ſo the metaphyſical Non-application of them, to any Subject at all, no leſs fatally tempts Men to withdraw their Aſſents to it; and the Loſs and want of one, has the ſame bad Effect, as wrong Aſſignations of it, and equally expoſes the Mind to draw Infidel Concluſions; and it is not Demonſtrations of the Divine Attributes, in an abſtracted Senſe, that are wanted, nor the Proof of our having in our ſelves Idea's and Notions of what are ſo called, which, could it clearly and regularly be done, (as it cannot) would ſtill leave

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us at a Loſs, (as we find by Experience it does, and ſubject to fluctuate in Diffidence,) for want of a real, acknowledged Subject capable of bearing them; in which we may ſee thoſe Attributes naturally veſted, and it eſſentiated with them, which alone can clear the Mind of Doubts, by Evidence, and Aſſurance, that thoſe Notions are not merely chimerical, but more than empty Fancies. But our Metaphyſicks, inſtead of doing this, and helping us out this Way, has forbid the very Attempt as impoſſible and impracticable, repreſenting this Subject as an Object beyond all our Idea's and Conceptions, ſuppoſes us to think of the Divine Attributes drawn off from this natural Foundation (tho' 'tis impoſſible for us ſo to think of them, and Nonſenſe to ſuppoſe it) and proper Subject of real Inexiſtency, and leaving them to us floating confuſedly in our Brains, not ſo much as *entia rationis*, for no better are all Abſtracts pretended to be drawn out of their natural State of real Exiſtency, and not applied to any concrete Subſtance, or real Form. So many indefinite, ſuſpended, imperfect Notions, deſtitute, inſignificant Notes, if they are untallied with their correſpondent Subject; together with which only they are capable of actually raiſing a juſt Idea in us. Mr. *Woollaſton* therefore I take to be quite wrong, when he ſays (Rel. of Nature, &c. §. 3.) *In Fact we find within ourſelves many logical, metaphyſical, mathematical Idea's, no one of*

which is limited to any particular, or individual Thing, &c. *So that we know from within ourſelves, that intelligent Beings, not only may have ſuch abſtract Idea's —— but that ſome actually have them.*

And Mr. *Lock* (Vol. 2. Chap. 6. Hum. Und.) *That abſtract Idea's are the Eſſence of Things.*

If we have in us any ſuch Idea's as Mr. *Woollaſton* ſpeaks of, they are mathematical only; *viz.* thoſe of *Lines* and *Dimenſion*, which the Mind can ſee and contemplate *immaterially*, as they call it; that is, under no particular Application to any Subject, but in pure and meer *Space*, which alone immediately ſupplies the Place of Subject, or Subſtance to them; an Argument to me, that they are not *Inexiſtencies*, but *real Exiſtencies* themſelves; and that *Extenſion* is itſelf ſubjective, and of the Eſſence of Being, ſo wants no other Subject than common or neceſſary Being to ſupport it or *be in*; and I agree ſo far with the Metaphyſician (Suarez. Diſp. 10. p. 171.) That *Magnitudines — ut ſunt ſub abſtractione mathematicâ, ſunt entia, non enim abſtrahunt ab eſſe.*

Ib.] *Quicquid à mathematico conſideratur eſt verum & abſolutum ens.*

Ib.] *Per illam abſtractionem non excluditur vera ratio entis.*

I admit that a mathematical *Line* conceived, is a true and real Being, but deny it is an *abſtract Idea*, becauſe it is not abſtract-

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ed from any Thing, or a partial Apprehenſion; for a Line is neither a part of any thing, nor any thing a part of that: And the Definition of it, ought not to be that it is *Longitude* without *Latitude*; but that it has it; and that it is not *longitudo ſine latitudine*, but *longum ſine lato*, in the Concrete.

Did Abſtracts really Exiſt, Things would have two real diſtinct Exiſtencies, as Objects of Science, and as Objects of Senſe; and each Thing would be two Things, and *unum* at that rate be no Attribute of Entity.

Mere Abſtracts raiſe no proper Ideas in us, neither have they any in that State and Situation, nor is it in the Power of the Mind to frame any ſimple or abſolute Notions of them, but they are Notes of ſecondary Reference, that ſend us to their reſpective Concretes to which we muſt run them home out of their State of imaginary Abſtraction, before we can fix their Idea, or Formally, or Objectively conceive what they import: For Inſtance, I defy the moſt refined Abſtracter, to form an Idea of Motion in himſelf, or actually conceive what it means, but by throwing up the Abſtraction, and conſidering it in ſome imaginary *(Motum)* Thing moved; nor to raiſe an Idea of Action or Paſſion, without ſetting before him ſome Agent or Patient, as its real Subject to ſupport it. Thus in like Manner, that ſet of abſtract Names that expreſs the Divine Attributes, and which, in Metaphyſical Account, are ſup-

poſed to conſtitute the Idea of God in us, in their abſtracted Condition, neither raiſe nor have any Idea at all. Neither have we any diſtinct Notion of them, nor can have, further than the Mind has a correſpondent Principle in view to ſupport them as their Subject, united to which and together with it in concrete Form, they become capable of raiſing an Idea in us; out of which pre-conceived Subject of their Inexiſtency they Spring, and on which the Mind founds thoſe abſtract Forms of Denomination, and to which (if their Senſe is called in Queſtion, or the Truth and real Exiſtence of the correſpondent Object, whoſe Characters they expreſs) the Mind muſt appeal for their Truth and Propriety, and by conſcious Recourſe to which, it can only vindicate thoſe Names from being empty Sounds; falſe, or rather unintelligible Cyphers.

There is not really and actually any ſuch ideal State as that of *Abſtraction*, wherein the Mind ſees and contemplates the Idea's of the Property of Concretes or Subſtances ſeparate from their Foundation; and taking off Modes and Accidents from the Exiſtents endued with them, preſents them to it ſelf, naked without their Subjects and conſiders them alone; we cannot propoſe to our ſelves as Objects of Speculation, Idea's of the Modes of Things, without the Idea's of the Things themſelves, whoſe Modes they are included and offer'd together with them; Abſtraction of

Idea's

Idea's is not a real Operation of the Mind, 'tis but a feign'd and nominal one, an Operation of Intention and Suppoſition; the Idea's that it calls Abſtracted, ſtand juſt where they did, as they did in the ſame State as before the Abſtraction; it ſees them lodged ſtill in their Concretes. All the alteration Name or Note of Abſtraction makes, is to tell you That whereas the whole Idea of ſuch a Being ſtands now before you, yet the whole Idea is not concern'd in the preſent Act of Intercourſe and Communication, but that ſuch circumſtantial Part and piece of it only, is deſigned the Object of your more immediate and particular Regard on that occaſion, (the reſt being ſecluded) as the Name of Abſtraction was inſtituted to give notice of; the Name marking out the Idea to you; whilſt its grammatical Quality, or being Coin'd into a Subſtantive, puts you in mind of its Limitation, and Seclusion of the reſt of the Idea; which is all the difference that there is between the Signification of abſtract Subſtantives, and their cognate Adjectives. They both raiſe the very ſame Idea, and deſign one and the ſame Objective Mode; they are both in Senſe and Signification Adjectives; the Abſtract can no more ſtand by it ſelf, in the Idea and Conception of the Mind, than the Adjective can; 'tis but a vocal Subſtantive, but in Logical, at leaſt in Phyſiologal Account, and in the Nature of Things, is Adjective: For Inſtance, The Abſtract Subſtantive, *Infinity* ſignifies the

ſame thing has not one, bit more or leſs in its Idea, than the Adjective *Infinite*. Out of which it is coin'd a Subſtantive, as all other Abſtracts in like Manner are out of their reſpective Adjectives; all the difference that its Subſtantivity adds to it, beyond what it had in its adjective Quality, is the Abſtraction it ſelf; the Idea I ſay, raiſed by the Word *Infinite* and *Infinity*, is the very ſame, only 'tis agreed between the Correſpondents that when the Idea is raiſed by the Word ſent in mark'd Subſtantively, that the Mode only is intended, and its Subject need not be conſider'd, by which the Adjective preſents together, without ſuch ſignified Preciſion. The Deſign of Abſtraction is to cumber the Mind with no more of a Thing than is wanted, not by mangling the Object, but by telling you that tho' it is all before you, yet your Application and Attention, to ſuch a particular part of it only upon that occaſion is required; admitting it therefore to be Matter of Diſpute, Whether there is a God? Admitting that ſuch Diſpute publickly managed, ought to be tolerated in a Chriſtian, or human Community, which for my part I think it ought not, on either ſide of the Queſtion; but as on one ſide, the profeſt Advancers of Atheiſm, as inhuman Monſters ought to be anſwered by ſolemn Act of Exciſion or Deportation, as Creatures fundamentally degenerated from the Species, and incapacitated for Society; ſo on the other ſide all formal and

and publick Defence of the Being of God, ought to be prohibited, as reproachful to the Societies natural Underſtanding, as well as moral, to have it brought upon the Stage as wanting Proof amongſt them; as injurious to the Dignity of the Object to be that way Canvaſſed. And ſuch pious Labours, had much better be let alone; the Honour that the very beſt of ſuch Lectures do to the Cauſe of Atheiſm, exceeds the Service they do the ſelf manifeſt which they aſſert and vindicate, that is its own beſt Evidence, bids defiance to Oppoſition whilſt it ſtands on its native Strength; but looſes ground by the impertinence of philoſophical Patronage; as an indemonſtrable, reduced to the Claſs of Probables, would ſuffer more by the Degradation, than any pretended Demonſtrations could fetch up. The inward Modes and Habitude of the Exiſtence of the Divine Being, may be diſputed, by adjuſting the Terms of its Revelation, ſo far, as they are Ambiguous: The inviſible things of God, whatever relations of the Divine Being to ours are inevident to us, and are not to be come at, but by Illation, and Acts Ratiocinatory, may be cleared and demonſtrated; its Providence, and its particular Extent down to the minuteſt Things, *Sparrows, the Hairs of our Head*, &c. proved and illuſtrated; its Wiſdom, Truth, Juſtice, *&c.* made appear; the diſpoſitions of the divine Mind to us; his *Goodneſs, Love, Mercy, Long-Suffering*, &c.

Exod.

Exod. 33. 6. being Characters not clearly diſcoverable to us thro' the dark and various Diſpenſations of Providence, are by divine Preſident, proper Subjects of learned Labour to convince the curious and inquiſitive of; the Being it ſelf preſuppoſed; but tho' we may vindicate ſome of the divine Attributes, yet to pretend to prove abſolutely that there is a God, or a Divine Being, the evident Subject of Attributes ſufficient to conſtitute that Idea, is beyond all Preſident, and ſo great a natural Folly, that I know not which is the greater, to prove, or deny it.

That Revelation does not determine for us, and tell us, which is the Subject of the Divine Attributes; the real Being, that is the Subſtance and particular Specifick, or individual Object, veſted with them, muſt be from one of theſe Reaſons; that we are either incapable of perceiving and knowing it; or that 'tis not neceſſary for us, diſtinctly, to perceive, or know; or elſe that it is not naturally wanted; that the firſt or ſecond is not the Reaſon, has, or will appear in what follows; We are ſo far from being incapable of perceiving it, or its Perception not being neceſſary, that it is impoſſible to perceive any thing, at leaſt its own Divine Attributes without it; for how ſhould we perceive them; but where they are, and in the Subject whoſe they are? And conſequently the third is the reaſon that ſuch Aſſignation is not naturally wanted; it being impoſſible, not

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to perceive it, the Perception of it, being inevitable

But ſuppoſe the Being of a God wanted Proof to us, to go about to prove it, by *Abſtract* Idea's of his Attributes, is the moſt prepoſterous, unnatural, and ſilly way in the World, or to demonſtrate (as is the common Method) the real Exiſtence of that, or any other, Concrete, from the abſtract Idea's of their Attributes or Properties in us; which are but mere Names that in themſelves, as ſuch, have no immediate Title to Exiſtence or Idea, but what ariſes out of the foreknowledge of that Concrete, that we go about to prove by them.

Thus by the very reverſe of the natural Order of our Knowledge and right Reaſoning, a Great and Learned Man, whoſe well intended Labours on that Subject I mention not to detract from, any farther than to Exemplify in them the obtaining Vanity of Argumentation on that Head, by thoſe Metaphyſical Favourites, *Abſtracts* and *Idea*'s; even under the beſt Direction, and moſt advantageous Management, and more effectually to expoſe it.

Dr. *Clark*'s Demonſtration of the Attributes and Being of God, (Prop. 4.) *What the Subſtance or Eſſence of that Being which is ſelf Exiſtent, or neceſſarily Exiſtent is; we have no Idea, neither is it at all poſſible for us to comprehend it.* (Prop. 5.) *Tho' the Subſtance, or Eſſence of the Self-exiſtent Being,*

is it ſelf abſolutely Incomprehenſible to us, yet many of his eſſential Attributes of his Nature, are ſtrictly demonſtrable, as well as his Exiſtence.

And accordingly he ſuppoſes, that tho' we have no Idea of an *Infinite* or *Eternal Being* or *Exiſtent*; yet we have of his *Exiſtence* and of his *Attributes*, &c. (*Page* 16.) *From the Idea's of* Infinity *and* Eternity, *&c.* That we find in our Minds, we may conclude; That there is a Being, *&c.* in which theſe Attributes are inherent, when the natural Order of our Knowledge runs quite the contrary Way; and 'tis from the immediate Perception of that Infinite Being, that he would prove by the Idea of *Infinity* in us, that we derive both the Name and Idea of *Infinity* it ſelf, could it have one in Abſtraction and of Infinite too, and from our *prior* View of an *Immenſe* and *eternal* Object, form the derivative Names of *Immenſity* and *Eternity*. But our Demonſtrators, dropping the real Being and Subject, in which thoſe Attributes are inherent, and diſowning it, put by Hypotheſis under another Name, and Character, having fooled the Mind out of the Foundation of thoſe Attributes, to ſalve the Inconvenience, and ſupply the natural Neceſſity of having one, would put back the Idea's of the Attributes upon us, as Proof, that they muſt certainly have one, and becauſe the next Queſtion to give Satisfaction, is, Which is it? What is it? To keep us quiet there, we are told

told, that it is ſuch, of which we have no Idea, nor Conception.

Well, but how in the mean time can theſe Idea's of the Divine Attributes, exiſt alone in the Mind, without their Foundation? Why they are Abſtracted, we are told; that is, by a trick that the Mind has got, drawn off from their Subſtance, and by a kind of Popiſh Philoſphy, making Accidents and Modes exiſt without Subjects.

Well but how ſhould the mind Abſtract from it does not know what? Or, what occaſion for the ſuperfluous Operation of Abſtraction of the Attributes from their Subſtance, when it never had them together or ſaw them united? If the Subſtance was never compreſent to the Mind, together, with the Idea of the Attributes, then they are no Abſtracts from it: If they are proper Abſtracts, then the Idea was compreſent with them, and if there was occaſion for their Abſtraction, then the Mind had, or has, an Idea of the Subſtance together with them, which is the Truth of the Caſe: What paſſes for the abſtracted Idea of the Attributes, includes in it, that of the Subſtance alſo, on which they depend; and together with that of theirs, muſt ſtand, or fall. The Subſtance we may know, without finding out all its Attributes, becauſe its inward Perfections are Inſcrutable, and we can only diſcover thoſe ſuperficial Ones as it were, that glare in the exterior Species and Form, that Objectively offers it ſelf; and

falls

fails under Notice, but one ſingle Attribute we cannot have naturally an Idea of, farther than the Subſtance or real Exiſtent it ſelf, whoſe it is, offers it to us Inherent in it.

Dr. *Clark* (*pag.* 16. *Dem.*) juſtly obſerves, *That Attributes exiſt only by the Exiſtence of the Subſtance to which they belong — and to ſuppoſe Attributes; and that there is no Subſtance, to which theſe Attributes are neceſſarily inherent, is a Contradiction.*

Now our Idea's and Knowledge of Things, muſt follow the Order of Things themſelves, and be ſubject to the ſame Neceſſities of Exiſtence and Conſtitution; and ſince Attributes exiſt only by the Exiſtence of the Subſtance to which they belong, they muſt be known to us only by the Knowledge of that Subſtance; and if it is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe there is no Subſtance to which theſe Attributes are neceſſarily inherent, 'tis the ſame Contradiction to pretend to know, or have an Idea of thoſe Attributes, and yet at the ſame Time to have none of the Subſtance; to know, is to be, to the Mind, and if the Attributes are known, and the Being whoſe they are, not yet ſo, then the Attributes are before, and without the Being to us, they are preſent; the Subſtance not ſo; and the Contradiction and Impoſſibility is acted and made Fact; if the Subſtance is proved by them, they known, itſelf unknown, nor poſſible to be apprehended, then there is

a wide,

a wide, natural Diſtance of Exiſtence made between them, and the Subſtance is not yet in a State of Exiſtence, at leaſt, till the Proof of it by them is perfected, whilſt they already ſtand confeſſed to it; and the Author's Title to his Work ought to be inverted, and not be *a Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God, but of the Attributes and Being, or the Being by the Attributes.* If the Attributes *are*, the Subſtance muſt *be*, it is moſt certain, but they do not prove, but ſuppoſe it, and prove it to be known; and the ſame Reaſon that proves our Idea's of *Infinity*, *Eternity*, &c. muſt belong to an *Infinite* and *Eternal Subſtance*, prove likewiſe, that that *Infinite* and *Eternal Subſtance* is better known to us than thoſe Attributes are, by a Priority and Superiority of Perception, and that proving it by them, is *notius ab ignotiore*, proving the Premiſes by the Concluſion, deriving the Fountain from the Stream; and his Principle, that *Attributes exiſt by the Exiſtence of their Subſtance*, is a Contradiction to his 4th and 5th Propoſition, and his Demonſtrations *raiſed upon them*; which are, That the Attributes are known and demonſtrable, but the Subſtance unknown and incomprehenſible, as to its *Quiddity*; and thoſe Propoſitions again are as plain, and literal Contradictions to his 3d, and his Conſequences from it; the very firſt of which tells us what is *the only true Idea of that ſelf-exiſtent Being*,

ing,&c. which his 4th and 5th Propoſitions tell us we have no manner of Idea of, neither can have.

And a little after, p. 17. *If any one asks what Sort of Idea, the Idea of that ſelf-exiſtent Being is, the Suppoſition of whoſe not exiſting is an expreſs Contradiction*; *I anſwer, 'Tis the firſt and ſimpleſt Idea we can poſſibly frame, or rather which we cannot poſſibly extirpate, or root out of our Minds.*

And page 21. *The Obſcurity and Defect of that Argument ſeems to lie in this, that it extends only to the nominal Idea or meer Definition of a ſelf-exiſtent Being, and does not with a ſufficiently evident Connexion, refer and apply that nominal Idea, Definition, or Notion, which we frame in our own Mind, to the real Idea of a Being actually exiſting without us*; *for it is not ſatisfactory that I have in my Mind an Idea of the Propoſition, there exiſts a Being indued with all poſſible Perfections, or there is a ſelf-exiſtent Being, but I muſt alſo have ſome Idea of the Thing*, &c.

He tells us, That we find in our Minds the Idea's of *Infinity* and *Eternity*, &c. but conſiders not whence we had them, or how we ſhould come by them, but as impreſſed on it, by their Subject preſent to the Mind.

But ſuppoſing it poſſible we did know the Attributes, and yet not know the Divine Subject, that is their Baſis, whoſe Attributes they are; yet how ſhould *they* demonſtrate it

to

to us, *When we have no Idea of it, and it is beyond the Reach of all our Faculties to underſtand it, and is abſolutely* incomprehenſible to us. For how ſhould they demonſtrate to us we do not know what, or which it is? How ſhould we judge whether 'tis proved or not, when we know not what we would have? Or what better are we when 'tis proved, when proved or unproved, we are to know nothing of it, nor have any Notion of it?

But, ſays our Demonſtrator, *Tho' we have no Notion of its Exiſtence or Subſtance, yet that there is ſuch a Being exiſting without us, we are ſure, by the ſtricteſt Demonſtration, and what it is not*, (Propoſ. 4.) *and what it is, as to its Exiſtence or Subſtance, this we are infinitely unable to comprehend; yet does not this in the leaſt diminiſh the Certainty of the Demonſtration of its Exiſtence.*

All which together, without mincing the Matter, I take to be no better nor worſe than a Heap of Nonſenſical Tautology, built on Diſtinction of Terms without Difference, and amount to thus much, what we do know of God that we do not know, and what we do not know, that we do.

Here are four Terms: 1. *Being*, 2. *Exiſtence*, 3. *Eſſence*, 4. *Subſtance: Abſtracts* all. Firſt change but their Grammatical Dreſs, and turn them into their Concretes, and we know not, nor have any Idea of any one of them, tho' as has been obſerved,

 their

their Idea's in both Forms is the ſame in the Mind, only the Abſtract gives the Mind a Signal of partial Apprehenſion of it, and that it need only apply its Intuition to ſuch a particular Part only, and need turn itſelf to no more of the Idea than is then neceſſary; for Example, The Divine *Exiſtence* we know and have an Idea of, but make it but *exiſtent*, and the Idea vaniſhes, and we can have none; the Divine *Being*, as *Being*, is a Subſtantive, and an Abſtract, and ſignifies *Entity*; *we are ſure of, that there is* (*ſuch*) *a Being*, but make it (*ens*) a Participle, deſigning the Divine Poſſident of that Entity, not the poſſeſſed; *and it is beyond the Reach of all our Faculties to underſtand it.* As for the other two Terms, the Divine *Eſſence* or *Subſtance, we have no Idea, neither is it poſſible for us to comprehend it*, either in concrete, or even abſtract Form; and yet, at laſt, all the four Terms in both Forms, are co-incident, and mean the very ſame Thing and Object; and if we have an Idea of one, we have an Idea of all; if we have none of one, we have none of any, for what is this unknown *Eſſence*, but the *Exiſtence* ſo well known? And what are either but *Being*; and what is *Subſtance* but *Being*, conſidered over again, only connoting Office as 'tis the Foundation of Attributes. They are but other Words for one another: *Being* is another Name for *Exiſtence*, and *Eſſence* another Name for both, or either, and each the

inadequate

inadequate Name and Idea of Subſtance; and what is all this frivolous Diſtinction of Terms, the *Eſſence* of the Divine Being, the *Exiſtence* of it, the *Subſtance* of it, but the ſame over again, under diſguiſed Repreſentation, the *Being* of the *Being*, and the *Being's Being*.

If we muſt know nothing of the *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* of the Divine Being, I cannot imagine what there is left for us to know or conceive, or for him to demonſtrate, or wherewith to demonſtrate, for the one is the Thing, *viz. Subſtance*, and the other, *viz. Eſſence* (if we intend them not for the ſame, is its Attributes; for by the Doctrine of the Schools (*omnia Dei Attributa ſunt eſſentialia*) all the Divine Attributes are eſſential, or God's Attributes are his *Eſſence*, and their Being (*de eſſentia*) of the *Eſſence*, is what diſtinguiſhes them from Properties, (Moor's Metaph. 4.) Suarez Diſp. 20. §. 6. Tom. Poſt. *Eſſe omnia Attributa de eſſentia Dei; quæ in Deo ſunt formaliter, quæ Attributa ejus à nobis dicuntur non ſunt aliud ab ejus eſſentia, &c.*

And that *Eſſence* is likewiſe the ſame with Subſtance or Being. God therefore is called his own (*eſſe per eſſentiam*) *Being by his Eſſence*, or his Eſſence is his Being. —— *Hæ perfectiones* (*viz.* ATTRIBUTA) *ſunt de ſubſtantia Dei nullus ſuper eſt modus quo poſſint eſſe de ſubſtantia, niſi ſunt etiam de eſſentia;*

And that Exiſtence again is really the ſame with Eſſence.

Suarez. Tom. poſt. Diſp. 30.§.1.) *Eſſe eſſentiæ, ſi vere condiſtinguitur ab exiſtentia, nihil rei addit ipſi eſſentiæ, ſed ſolum differt ab illa, in modo quo concipitur, vel ſignificatur.*

Id. Diſp. 30. *Actu exiſtere eſſe de eſſentia Dei* God's Exiſtence is (of) his Eſſence, nor are the two Terms admitted ſo much as mental Preciſion.

(Aquin. p. 1. Q. 3.) *Deus eſt ſuum eſſe, et eſſentia.* God's Being is his Eſſence; So that this inconceivable and unknown *Eſſence*, are thoſe very ſame conceivable and well known Attributes, by whoſe abſtract Idea's, form'd in our Minds, he works the Demonſtrations of the *Divine Being*.

I need go no farther for Argument, to juſtify my Deſign, which is to aſſign a Subject for the Divine Attributes, and to evidence the Neceſſity of acknowledging one, in order to aſſent diſtinctly, and upon natural Conviction within, to the Being of God, then to mark out the Misfortunes of this ſo eminent and learned Demonſtrator, and the egregious Follies, and notorious Blunders that he runs himſelf into the Guilt of, by proceeding upon a contrary Hypotheſis, and pretending to prove the Divine Being to us, and yet, that it is impoſſible for us to have any Idea of it, or to know what or which the Object ſo called is, of which this 4th Propoſition, and the Demonſtration attending

ing it, is Example enough; which, the more I conſider of, the more I find the Author plunging himſelf and us, over Head and Ears in Nonſenſe, Inconſiſtency, and Contradiction.

The Deſign in itſelf is wild, to prove that to *be*, which 'tis ſuppoſed impoſſible for us to know what, or which it is? What more extravagant Scheme can there be, then firſt to go to prove the Divine Attributes by themſelves *to be*, without their Being; and then to prove by them the Being itſelf to *be*, without our knowing which or what it is? He inverts the natural Progreſs and Order of our Knowledge, by pretending to prove the *Quoddity* of the Divine Being, which is naturally incapable of being proved argumentatively, or propoſitionally; for Being, unleſs it means Form and Compoſition, cannot be predicated but by its *Quiddity*, or what it is, which he himſelf preſuppoſes and includes, as known; Firſt, under the Name of *Subſtance*, he gives up the Knowledge of the Divine Being, as inconceivable, and not to be known; and then, from its Attributes, would make amends, by proving, that there is one, whilſt under the Name of Eſſence. Again, he gives up the Knowledge of thoſe very Attributes too.

This precarious, falſe Hypotheſis of his, That it is impoſſible to conceive what the Divine Subſtance is, nor can we have any Notion of the Subject of the Divine Attri-

butes, lies as a Worm at the Root of all his pretended Demonſtrations to prove there is a God, and gives more away to the Cauſe of Atheiſm, than he and twenty more ſuch Demonſtrators, can fetch up again; and I would fain know upon what Reaſon or Authority of Nature or Revelation, he takes upon him ſo liberally and peremptorily to make that Conceſſion, all that I have met with tending that Way, is an Expreſſion of *Damaſcene*'s, quoted by *Aquinas* :(*prima pars* Art. 1.)*in Deo quid eſt dicere impoſſibile eſt*; it is not *poſſible for us to expreſs* (not what God is) *but what is in God, or all that is in God*, manifeſtly relating to the inward Perfections of the Divine Nature, and its Attributes, not their Subject or Foundation; which *Aquinas*, and others after him, have by Miſconſtruction run away withal, and turned to a Maxim, That it is impoſſibe for us to know the *Quid ſit* of God, *viz.* what or which the Divine Subſtance, or Subject of the Divine Attributes are.

The fatal Conſequences of this Conceſſion, our Demonſtrator(very unſucceſsfully,I think) attempts to mitigate the Senſe of in us,and to take off the Neceſſity of knowing which or what the *Subſtance* of the Divine Being is, in order to our knowing and being ſure that it is, and to perſuade us, That we may do very well without it, telling us,

Firſt, That our ſuppoſed Ignorance, which, or what it is, — *does not in the leaſt diminiſh*

iſh the Certainty of the Demonſtration of its Exiſtence (Propoſ. 4.)

His Demonſtration, is indeed, as good one Way as the other, for admitting the Suppoſition, That 'tis impoſſible to conceive what it is, that he demonſtrates to us; and the Demonſtration is Folly and Impertinence that Way; admitting that we do know it (as 'tis impoſſible but we ſhould) and 'tis no leſs ſo the other; and 'tis well for us that we are forced in ſpite of our ſelves, to know in Reality, what we make ourſelves ignorant of by Suppoſition; and that it is not left in the Power of any fond Suppoſers, ſo far to trick us out of the Notices of that fundamental Object in which the Divine Attributes ſhine into the Mind, but it will (however imaginarily diſowned) do its Office to the Mind in ſupporting them.

What the *Being* is, is not to be known, he can only demonſtrate it to *be*; as if *the Being*, and its *to be*, were not all one.

Secondly, The Doctor tells us, by Way of Conſolation, That tho' we cannot tell what the Divine Being is, yet we do know, and *he has demonſtrated what it is not* (Prop. 4). Which I take to be an abſurd Aſſertion, becauſe the Force of all negative Knowledge is founded in poſitive, and had we no poſitive Idea or Conception what the Divine Subſtance was, all Subſtance, and all Being, muſt be equally it to us, or none ſo; nor can we rationally pronounce this or that not to be it, but by its diſagreeableneſs to ſome poſitive

Conception or Idea the Mind has formed of it, when we deny for Inſtance the material World to be the Divine Subſtance, the Negation is founded on Notes of Diſſimilitude in corporeal Subſtance to the Mind's Conceptions of the Divine; and we ſay it is not it, becauſe comparing it with our Conception, what it is, it does not anſwer, but is different, and not like it.

Thirdly, The Doctor tells us, *That it is one Thing to know certainly that a Being exiſts, and another to know what the Eſſence of that Being is; and the one may be capable of the ſtricteſt Demonſtration, when the other is abſolutely beyond the Reach of all our Faculties.* Prop. 4.)

What the Author wants, to do him moſt Service, is not the ſuppoſed Poſſibility of knowing *that a Thing is*, without knowing *what it is?* But the other Way, whether we can know what a Thing is, without knowing that it is, whether we can know the Modes without the *Thing* whoſe Modes they are, and the *Thing* afterwards by another diſtinct act of Knowledge; whether we can know the Divine Attributes by abſtract Idea's *à priori*, and the Being itſelf *à Poſteriori* from them: Or to make good this wonderful 4th *Propoſition*, Whether we can know a Thing to *be*, without knowing either Thing or Modes, for that's the Caſe; whether we can know Being to be Being, without knowing Being, or know a Thing to be, without *Eſſence* or *Subſtance*.

But

But, indeed, 'tis naturally impoſſible, one Way or the other, either to know *what a Thing is*, without knowing *that it is*; or *that it is*, without knowing *what it is*. The real *Quoddity* of an Object cannot be apprehended by us, without ſome *Quiddity* included; and tho' we are incapable of knowing the whole Eſſence or Manner of the Divine Being, yet we cannot apprehend it, but under ſome modal Notes of Difference from other Objects; and Being itſelf, that is the ſimpleſt of Objects, and which is all *Quoddity*, yet cannot be underſtood or conceived by us, unleſs *quiddatively*, and therefore, when Being is the Object, we explain *that which is*, by *what it is*, and reſolve back again the Queſtion, *what it is*, into that which is; the *that* and the *what* of our Conception of all Being, and eſpecially of the Divine, ſo far as we know it, is the ſame; and the Author betrays himſelf, to think, in Contradiction of his own Propoſition, and to have in him a formed Conception of that *manner of the Divine Exiſtence* which he ſuppoſes ſo inconceivable, by the Word *ſuch*, that there is *ſuch a Being actually exiſting without us, we are ſure.* (Prop. 4.) which is a Note of Similitude to ſome conceived Character of the *Subſtance*, and of ſome Mode of its Exiſtence; himſelf adjuſts the Manner of the Divine Exiſtence, deſcribes it by the Notes eſſential, of *Independence*, *Neceſſity*, *Self-exiſtence*, which if they expreſs any Thing, expreſs

expreſs the Manner of that Exiſtence of the Divine Being, whilſt he is hard at work to prove, we have no Notion of it.

But the moſt unfortunate Part of his Reaſoning, to prove that we may know that the Divine Being exiſts, and yet may not know what it is, is the Inſtance he produces of the Blind and Deaf Man, as parellel Caſes to ſupport his Propoſition, which he is extreamly fond of, and is often up withal.

(Prop. 4.) *A Blind, or Deaf Man, has infinitely more Reaſon to deny the Being, or the Poſſibility of the Being of Light or Sounds, than any Atheiſt can have to deny or doubt of the Exiſtence of God,* &c. *wherefore nothing can be more unreaſonable, and weak than for an Atheiſt to deny, upon this Account, the Being of a God, merely becauſe his weak and finite Unnderſtanding cannot frame it ſelf any adequate Notion of the Subſtance or Eſſencc of that firſt and Supreme Cauſe.*

(Being of Light or Sounds) 'tis not very Philoſophical to call Affections of Motion wrought in us, to Diverſify our ſenſatious of *Being*; and the dreſſing them up in Terms of real Exiſtence, the better to ſerve his turn, matching them as Parellels to the Being of God, is neither very decent in it ſelf, nor ſeaſonably produced, whilſt he is converting Atheiſts, to ſet the Reality of the Divine Subſtance ſo in Compariſon with Names of empty Relations that have no Exiſtence but in our Fancies; can he think this the way to convert

vert Atheiſts, and demonſtrate God's Being to them? To demonſtrate that we know juſt as much what he is, as a Blind Man does of Colours, or a Deaf one of Sounds? The blind Man believes juſt as much of Colours as he knows, and no more, and the deaf Man the ſame of Sounds, that is nothing to the Purpoſe, becauſe they do not underſtand, the one what the Word *Colour*, and the other what the Word *Sound*, ſignifies, nor have in them either the Idea's, that the Words were inſtituted to refer to, nor any but diſperate Ones to apply them to; and then were our not knowing what the Eſſence or Subſtance of the Divine Being is, and yet believing that it is Parallell'd, if we do not know what *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* meant. Beſides, the Blind and deaf Man do not believe that there are Sounds and Colours, neither can, without ſubſtituting ſome wild Idea's to ſupply the Place of the true, and ſome real Foundation imagin'd. The blind Man and Deaf, have no reaſon in Nature to believe there are ſuch Objects as Sounds and Colours, but mere Authority, which on other Occaſions, would gobut a little way with ourDemonſtratour; but I find thoſe Patrons of the Rights of humane Underſtanding; who at one time declaim ſo loudly againſt the Impoſitions of Authority, and the obſtruſions of Objects they can frame no Notion or Idea of, can when they pleaſe, upon philoſophical Tradition, with Bigotry,

gotry, make wantonly ſuppoſed Inconceivables,their favourite *datums:* SomeThings muſt not be aſſented to, becauſe Inconceivable; others muſt be Inconceivable, or they will not acknowledge them, and take juſt as much Pains to prove them Inconceivable, in order to our Agnition,as they do to deſtroy our Aſſents to others,becauſe they are ſo. The blind Man believes thoſe that have Eyes, and the Deaf thoſe that have Ears, but in the caſe of Gods Being, he makes us all Blind and Deaf, diſputing with each other about Sounds and Colours, with mutual Abſurdity and equal Folly, one Side pretending to demonſtrate they do not know what, and the other to deny they do not know what, and they do not know why.

Laſtly, Let me obſerve that the Propoſition is ridiculous, by the barbarous Conſtruction and Miſapplication of its Terms.

Subſtance or *Eſſence*, are put upon us as Terms equivalent, which I take rather to to ſtand as Oppoſites; like *Subſtance* or *Accidents*, or *Matter* and *Form*. Subſtance ſpeaking the *Materiale*, *Eſſence* the *Formale*.

The Subſtance of Being, eſpecially of the *Divine Being*, I take to be barbarous Conſtruction, as if *Being* were not the ultimate *Baſis* of Things, but *Subſtance* lay ſtill behind it, by which it was poſſeſſed, and on which it was Superſtructed. Or, Being it ſelf not Subſtantial, or Subſtance was nor Being, Subſtance is Being conſider'd with Relation to Superſtructions.

Oppoſing

Oppoſing the *Eſſence* of the Divine Being, ſo far to its Exiſtence, as to ſuppoſe the latter to be known to us, and the former to be impoſſible to be known, I take not to be agreeable to the near Signification of thoſe two Terms, the latter including the former, with ſomething Super-added; and that raiſing ſuch objective Differences in the Divine Being tend dangerouſly to ſupplant its Simplicity.

The whole Propoſition is a piece of inextricable Confuſion and Diſtraction, all the Terms of it run into one, and are radically the ſame; *Subſtance* is *Being*, *Eſſence* is *Being*, *Exiſtent* is *Being*, and *Exiſtence* is *Being*; *Exiſting*, is *Being*; and, *is*, is, *is Being*: So that *Being* that cannot bear Predication, not even in that ſhorteſt Form that the Logicians called *de Secundo adjacente*; or ſaying that *it is*, without being *Identical*, is after the moſt trifling Manner, made triply and quadruply ſo, by pileing Identity on Identity, as ſet it out Explicitely in its full length that Metaphiſicks preſcribes, will appear; the *Being* (Subſtance) or (Eſſence) *Being* of that *Being*, which (is) *Being* ſelf (Exiſtent) *Being*, (is) *Being* a *Being* actually (*exiſting*) *Being* without us.

In like manner (Anſwer to Letter 6th) he ſays, *That neceſſary Attributes do neceſſarily and inſeperably infer or ſhow to us a neceſſary Subſtance, of which Subſtance it ſelf we have*

have no Image, becauſe it is the Object of none of our Senſes.

How is it ſhown to us then? Or how is it neceſſary, ſince by neceſſary, *He means both neceſſary in it ſelf, and needful to the Exiſtence of any thing elſe whatſoever*, viz. *to our Conception of the Exiſtence of every thing*, (Anſwer to Letter the 2d.)

Strange, indeed, that it ſhould be neceſſary to our conceiving every Thing, and yet be inconceivable it ſelf, and that it ſhould be the Object of none of our Senſes, for the Objects conceived by them, are ſomething however.

In the ſame ſtrain talks Mr. *Woollaſton* (Relig. of Nat. §. 5.) *Such a Being*, (viz *neceſſary Being) is above all things that fall under our Cognizance; and its manner of Exiſtence is above all our Conceptions, and nothing of this Kind*, (viz. *that is neceſſary) is within our Comprehenſion; we know no Being but what we can imagine not to be, without any Contradiction or Repugnance to Nature, nor do we know any beſides this Supreme Being himſelf — we cannot know him how he Exiſts, and yet we cannot but know that he Exiſts neceſſarily.*

This Paſſage is ſo much a Paraphraſe on Dr. *Clark*'s 4th Propoſition, that he ſeems to have Copied from him, and as it is made up of the ſame obvious Inconſiſtencies, ſo it is liable to the ſame Cenſure.

If

If *neceſſary Being* is *inconceivable* to us; it muſt be ſo, either *quatenus Being*, or *quatenus* Neceſſary; it cannot be *quatenus Being* that it is *inconceivable* to us; for *Being* is the ſame as *Object*, or Matter of Knowledge and Perception offer'd to the Mind; and when we ſay a thing is, we mean, that it is an Object or Matter of Knowledge offer'd to the Mind, conceived or conceivable, and *Inconceivable Being*, is therefore Nonſenſe; the *Diviſion* of *Being* into *abſolute* and *Reſpective*, and of the Divine Attributes into abſolute and *Relative*, is groundleſs; if abſolute means what has no Relation to us, for all our Knowledge (as I have elſewhere ſhewed in the Treatiſe of which this is a Part;) is reſpective, and all its Objects Relative and no further than they are ſo; for deſtroy the Relation of a Being to us, and you deſtroy both the End and Means of our knowing it; for why ſhould we know it, if it has no Relation to us, and how ſhould we know it, but by Relation to our perceptive Faculties? Our Relations exceed our Knowledge, many things concern us that we are not acquainted withal, but we cannot know beyond our Relations.

Nay, *Being* does not only mean *Object*, but the Metaphyſicians tell us, that it is the proper Object of the Mind; the ſame as Light to the Eye, or Sound to the Ear, the (*primum cognocibile*) the firſt Cognoſcible, before and beyond all other its ſuperſtructed Objects,

Objects apparent and notoriouſly obvious, *a Self-manifeſt*, that we may Reaſon our ſelves out of the Knowledge of, but cannot reaſon our ſelves into it; becauſe we perceive it by immediate Intuition, or thoſe immediate Evidences, the want of which our Reaſon is only to ſupply: We know it better than any thing that we can prove it by, it is nearer and clearer to us than any of its own Attributes or Affections whatſoever, which we may prove by it, but not it by them; it muſt ſupport them before they can ſpeak any thing for it; its Notifications are more preſent to all our Faculties and Senſes, than they that are Secondary Objects of Recommendation from it.

If God's *Being* were Inconceivable; his revealing himſelf to *Moſes*, and the Children of *Iſrael* under that Name and Character, as God; had been no Revelation at all, (*Exod.* 3.) and his calling himſelf *I am* the ὁ ὤν. *Being* was no Anſwer, unleſs it Imported a *quidditative* Deſignation of an Object and was intelligible, which had it been ſo in itſelf, yet its *Neceſſity* would have made it otherwiſe it ſeems, for it muſt then be its *Neceſſity* that ſets the Divine Being out of Sight to us and beyond the reach of our Faculties, and it is therefore Inconceivable becauſe it is *Neceſſary*, which Mr. *Woollaſton* accordingly gives as Reaſon in the Paſſage afore-cited, if it were and might not be it ſeems it were conceivable, but becauſe it muſt *be*, it cannot

not be conceived, if its *Neceſſity* makes it inconceivable, how came they to conceive that Neceſſity itſelf, for if 'tis inconceivable, that which makes it ſo, muſt ſtill be more ſo. Neceſſity they tell us, is *Self-exiſtent*; what ſtrange work is this? they penetrate the Profundities of it, ſearch out and diſcover to us its moſt intimate Modes, are let ſo far into the Notices of the Quality of its Exiſtence within it ſelf, as to determine on what Foot it ſtands, and yet know nothing of it without, and can have no Conception of its ſuperficial Character; they know how it is, and muſt be within, but without, cannot imagine what, or which Thing it is; the Apartments and all the Inſide they are Maſters of, and they are clear to them, but the Houſe it ſelf is inviſible.

By Neceſſary, as *Suarez* explains it, we are to underſtand *a ſimple ad abſolute Neceſſity of Exiſtence an intrinſical Impoſſibility of loſing its Being, or being deprived of it, either by it ſelf, or another, that which has its Being on ſuch Terms from itſelf, that it cannot want it*, (Tom. Poſt Diſp. 28. §. 8.)

And Dr. *Clark*, ſometimes expreſſes it by *Self-exiſtent*, ſometimes by *Independent*; againſt which, let me obſerve, that our Knowledge of all Subſtance, is at beſt but Superficial, we cannot break thro' the coat of it as it were, nor are capable of diving into the inſide to perceive any thing Immanent, or how it is, or what is a doing there, much leſs can we do ſo, as to the Divine Subſtance: But that

which is not poſſible to be conceived, *that* our Philoſophy will have us to conceive, that which is conceivable, that we muſt not; ruſhing as it were abruptly at once, into the inmoſt Receſſes and Abyſſes of the Divine Being; they report to us the State and Condition of its Exiſtence within itelf, whilſt without, they know not which the thus moded Exiſtent is, nor can reach ſo much as the *back Parts*, or outer Skirts of the Subſtance, which muſt be nearer to them, whoſe *abſolute Independence* and *Self-Exiſtence*, they ſee thro' it; they carry us up to the Third Heaven, but declare the firſt and ſecond, thro' which the Way lies, to be inacceſſible.

All the *Neceſſity* of Being that we can know any Thing of, is an outward and relative Neceſſity, not what or how it is in itſelf, but, as to us, as an Object relating to our Faculties. *Neceſſity* does not expreſs the abſolute and irreſpective Character of the Exiſtent, called *Neceſſary*, nor conveys immediately any Idea of a ſimple Perfection in it, with regard to itſelf, either negatively, as not being an Emanation from another, or owing its Original to any external or ſuperior Cauſe; nor poſitively, as having included in itſelf all the Reaſons of its own Exiſtence independently; but its *Neceſſity* expreſſes the Idea or Notion of its Habitude to our Being and our Faculties, as their Object, and the Condition and high Degree of its Relation to all the effectual Acts and Operations of

our

our Minds ; and how it ſtands between us and it, as to the Acts of our Perception and Underſtanding, and the Exerciſe of our Thoughts ; *neceſſary Being* or *Object* is that which we cannot think without, or *be* without.

An *abſolute Neceſſity*, as *abſolute*, is oppoſed to *relative*, is a Contradiction in Terms, a Repugnancy *in adjecto*, for *neceſſary* is an Idea of *Relation*, *abſolute* its oppoſite, the Idea of none, which put together, deſtroy each others Signification : Nay, *neceſſary* is not only an Idea or Relation, to which abſolute cannot be added, unleſs cumulatively, as it means perfect or compleat ; but of exterternal and foreign Relation, points out another Subject without, in which it terminates, ſignifies a Habitude to ſome Subject different from that which it denominates, a Relation between two : We cannot properly turn the Habitude it expreſſes, inward, or back, into itſelf; for nothing is related to itſelf, nor neceſſary in itſelf, or to itſelf; and how ſucceſsfully therefore Dr. *Clark* employs his Pains in explaining *neceſſary Being* to us, telling us, *That neceſſary Means, Self-exiſtent, and Self-exiſtent by exiſting by an abſolute Neceſſity originally in the Nature of the Thing*, Prop. 3. Anſ. to Letter 6. (*a Neceſſity not relative*) we may perceive; yet he is ſo poſſeſſed with the Notion of *abſolute Neceſſity*, as to ſay (*p.* 15. & 17.) That this is the only Idea of an *abſolute Neceſſity that we can frame, and to uſe the Word in any other*

Senſe, ſeems to be uſing it without any Signification at all; which indeed is true, *abſolute* and *neceſſary* together, ſignify nothing at all. *Neceſſary Being* therefore, is not that which is *neceſſary* in itſelf, but that which is *neceſſary* to us, not to our Being, nor ſignifies that which we cannot be without, for tho' it really is ſo,(yet that does not preſently and primarily appear but is an After-thought); but that which we cannot think without; neceſſary Being, is an inevitable Object that will be in our Thoughts and View, whether we will or no, that which if we think at all, we muſt think of; that which we may think of alone, without any Thing elſe, but cannot think of any Thing elſe without it, being that which we ſee in all Things, and ſee all Things in, as their common *Medium*; it is that Object that we cannot think of from, by any Efforts of the Mind, that we cannot think beſide, nor before nor after, nor by any Artifice abſtract other Things from, or any Part of it from itſelf, or deſtroy in our ſelves; but it will ſtill, in ſpight of all our Endeavours be preſent, and in every Act of Thought or Perception ſet itſelf in View before us; and Dr. *Clark* rightly deſcribes its Neceſſity accordingly, when quitting *Self-Exiſtency* and *Independency*, he ſays, *'Tis that which forces itſelf in upon us, whether we will or no, even when we are endeavouring to ſuppoſe that no ſuch Being exiſts*, (pag. 16.) *which (unleſs we forbear thinking) we cannot poſſibly extirpate or remove out of our Minds.* Dr.

Dr. *Clark*'s Anſwer to Letter 2.] *Nothing can be poſſibly conceived to exiſt, without preſuppoſing Space, which I therefore apprehend to be a Property of the ſelf-exiſtent Subſtance, and that by being neceſſary itſelf, it proves that Space of which it is a Property, muſt alſo be neceſſary.*

Anſw. to Let. 1.] *If any Thing could exiſt without Space, it would follow that Space and Time were not neceſſarily exiſting, being itſelf neceſſary.*

Fourth Let. to Dr. *Clark*.] *Space ſeems to be as abſolutely ſelf-exiſtent as any Thing can be, ſo that make what other Suppoſitions we pleaſe, yet we cannot help ſuppoſing immenſe Space.*

Ib. *'Tis manifeſtly neccſſary it ſelf, as well as antecedently needful to the Exiſtence of all other Things, not excepting (as I think) even the Self-exiſtent Subſtance*; (2d Letter) *whatſoever is neceſſarily exiſting there is need of its Exiſtence in order to the ſuppoſal of the Exiſtence of another Thing, which is* ἐν δια δυοῖν, *that need is all the Neceſſity of Exiſtence that we know of.*

This *Neceſſity* of our Perception and Aprehenſion of it, being then the confeſs'd State of the objective Relation between our Minds and *neceſſary Being*, that it is an invincible and inevitable ſelf Manifeſt, ſo that it is not in the Power of our Minds to put by the Notices of it; or even by Suppoſition to defeat its conſcious Senſe and Knowledge of it,

or to imagine it not to be, or not to be known to it, is it not monſtrous, that it ſhould want ſo much as Indication, and more ſo that our Demonſtratours ſhould not only be at a loſs to know which or what it is, but giving up that as impoſſible, think they have done ſomething, in proving, that there is any ſuch Thing, or Object at all, that thus diſtinguiſhes it ſelf from all others, by a neceſſary Impoſition of itſelf on our Thoughts, and inevitably ruſhes in together with every Object that can exerciſe Thought? whoſe impregnable Entity, we can by no Contrivances eupunge or nullify the Idea, or rather immediate Conception or Perception of in our ſelves? If it is *neceſſary Being*, its Neceſſity is its own Evidence and Demonſtration without impertinently running to Logick, or Reaſoning about it; the Matter is preſently and eaſily to be tried by Fact and and Experiment, and bringing Things inductively to the Teſt; if there be an Object that approves it ſelf, to the Mind under all the aforemention'd Characters of Neceſſity, *that* without more ado makes good its Title, and Evinces it ſelf to be the Thing beyond all Contradiction, unleſs ſome Competitor can be produced to do the like; and upon Tryal made in himſelf, I appeal to every Man's Conſcience, whether *Space* be not *neceſſary Being*, and whether it does not fully, and only, fairly entitle it ſelf to our Acknowledgements

ledgements of its being that moſt auguſt Object, that root of Things and Thought from whoſe ſelf Manifeſtation of it ſelf, we derive the original Notices of thoſe mighty Attributes, whoſe Idea's, together with it, conſtitute the natural Idea of God in us, and whoſe Vindication of themſelves from being only Creatures of the Mind, is appeal to it, that exhibits thoſe its eſſential Endowments to our Contemplation; which by the execrable Effects of humane Folly and Philoſophy, is forced to call in the Aſſiſtance of thoſe its own Attributes, which it ſuſtains, to ſupport by their Teſtimony, the Acknowledgement, not of its Self-being, the *Divine Being*, but that there is any ſuch at all; and that fundamental Object, and ſubſtantial Vehicle from which by natural Order firſt known, we gradually trace out the Divine Attributes, and by viewing them in which we aſſure our ſelves of their Truth and Reallity, and have them Exemplified in it, has the Reallity of its own Exiſtence diſtruſted, paſſes for a vain and empty Name; and tho' it does the Office of Foundation to the Divine Attributes, and every way ſatisfies the Character, yet it is not allowed to do it, tho' it has no Rival to the Office; and we have no other Object to put up againſt it, and ſupply it Place, yet by I know not what Philoſophical Perverſeneſs and Infatuation, they are not more Zealous in aſſerting that there is ſuch a one, than in diſowning this. And chooſe rather to let it lie an

unknown and undetermin'dObject in the dark, to which they give a blind-fold Aſſent, then acknowledge Space to be it; Dr. *Clark* is pleaſed to think *it unreaſonable in an Atheiſt, upon this Account, to deny the Being of God, merely becauſe his finite and weak Underſtanding cannot frame it ſelf any adequate Notion of the Subſtance or Eſſence of that ſupreme Cauſe*, (p. 39.) but he finds in Fact that it is ſo, and ſo far from being unreaſonable, that the Minds want of a Subject to fix the Divine Attributes in, is ſuch an eſſential Defect, that could it be real, as he would have it, it would be naturally impoſſible to aſſent to the Being of God without it; would force us all to be Atheiſts, and put it out of our Power to aſſent to it, for want of a Foundation for its Attributes, nor can we now aſſent to it, but by breaking thro' the Laws of our Philoſophy, and the ſuppoſed Incomprehenſibility of that Subſtance that ſupports them; by having which diſowned Object in view, the Mind ſupports its Aſſents, and furniſhes it ſelf with Notices of the Divine Attributes, and our Caſe may be repreſented in thoſe Words *of* Pliny (Lib. 28. Cap. 2.) *Viritim ſapientiſſimi cujuſque reſpuit fides, in univerſum vero omnibus horis credit vita, nec ſentit.* The happy Neceſſity of the Object prevents the fatal Effects of our Philoſophy, ſo far as they are prevented.

'Tis the Mind's view of the Divine *Subſtance*, and *Being*, their Subject, that does and only

only can furniſh the Mind with Notices and Idea's of its Attributes, which our Metaphyſicians, turning into Abſtracts, realize them in that nominal Form, and forgetting whence they had them, ſet aſide their Subject, and finding no other, make them the ground of Demonſtration to prove they muſt have one, but 'tis *inconceivable*; and thus leaving us nothing to Aſſent to, but ſome empty Thoughts and Words, ſo what they call the Idea of God (all its objective Reality being evaporated) vaniſhes into the Brain Smoke, *of an infinite and incomprehenſible Nothing.* Dr. Clark, (p. 18. Demonſt. &c.) Obſerves *that all Arguments drawn from our Idea's of Self exiſtence*, &c *in our Iaea Definition or Notion of God, is far from being a clear and obvious Demonſtration, fitted to convince and put the Atheiſt to Silence, appears from the endleſs Diſputes maintain'd by Learned Men concerning it, the Obſcurity and Defect of which Argument, ſeems to lie in this, That it extends to the nominal Idea or mere Definition of a Self Exiſtent Being, and does not with a ſufficient evident Connexion, refer and apply that nominal Idea, Definition, or Notion which we frame in our Mind, to the real Idea of a Being actually Exiſting without us, for it is not Satisfactory, that I have in my Mind an Idea of the Propoſition there exiſts a Being endued with all poſſible Perfections, or there is a Self-exiſtent Being, but I muſt alſo have ſome Idea of the thing*, (p. 21.)

Here

Here we have an ample Confeſſion both of the Truth of what I aſſert, the Neceſſity of a Subject of Application of the Idea's of Self-Exiſtence, and of God to, without which all Argument and Demonſtration is lame and ineffectual to prove it, and as ample a Contradiction of his own Doctrine of their Inconceiveableneſs.

And his Charge he fixes on the Schoolmen, falls on himſelf, when he tells us, *That as in other Matters, ſo in their Diſputes about the ſelf-exiſtent Being, give us Terms of Art, and Words of Amuſement, meer empty Sounds, which under Pretence of explaining the Matter before them, have really no Manner of Idea or Signification at all; thus when they tell us concerning the Eſſence of God, That he is* puruſactus mera forma, *and the like, the Words have no Meaning or Signification at all, or*, &c. (*p.* 41.)

He ought not to blame the Inconceivableneſs of the Words, becauſe they are ſuited to his Doctrine of the Inconceiveableneſs of the Thing which occaſioned and required ſuch a Choice to humour it; for whether is worſe, to make God and his Eſſence nominally, or really inconceivable? The Inconceivableneſs of the Names are the Conſequence of making the Things ſo, does not himſelf make the *Name God, ſelf-exiſtent Being, Divine Eſſence*, as inconceivable Names, and as much without Idea, as thoſe he finds fault withal? Does he not oblige us, with the old *Athenians*, to worſhip the *Unknown God*, or with the *Samaritans*,

tans, we know not what? And worſe than either, making no Application at all of the Divine Attributes; to Worſhip or properly aſſent to nothing at all, or with imperfect and ſuſpended Aſſents, ſceptically to reſt in the Name *God*, and make the *empty Sound*, and material Figure of the Word, the Center in which the Attributes and our Aſſents terminate; or at beſt, to ſupplant the ſimple and natural Reality both of the Divine Attributes and Subſtance, and make Modes of Cogitation, and the Operations of our Minds, our God, to idolize our own imaginary Abſtractions; by the grand Bubble Metaphyſicks, and its Terms, cheating us out of the Conception of all Reality, ſo that inſtead of apprehending *neceſſary*, *real Being*, we are put off with what is neither *neceſſary*, *real*, nor *Being*, making the only ſelf-evident beyond Contradiction ſo, the Object of greateſt Uncertainty; and inſtead of its being the moſt familiar, preſent, unavoidable Object of every Thought, of every Senſe and Faculty, the moſt ſecret, reſerved, abſtruſe, and unaccountable of all others; for which, as a Thing moſt remote from all our Faculties, we are ſent to roam after in the utmoſt Regions of ſubtile Contemplation, and the Apprehenſion of it muſt be reſerved for the laſt Effort of human Underſtanding; ridiculouſly treat what is *Infinite* and *Omnipreſent*, as a Thing in the Dark, and hid in a Corner, and under the Notion of Sublime Speculation, complement our

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ſelves into the Hypothetical Ignorance of that which we cannot be ignorant of.

In order to reſtore the Divine Attributes to Space, as their proper Subject, I will

Firſt, *Conſider the Strength of its Title to our Acknowledgment of its ſo being.*

Secondly, *Obſerve the Vanity, Weakneſs, and Inconſiſtency of the Objections that are made againſt its ſo being, and of the Prejudices that are the Grounds of our diſowning it to be ſo.*

And *Firſt*, Let us conſider the Strength of its Claim and Title to our Acknowledgements, of its being *neceſſary Being*. That there is ſuch an Object, is admitted, that appears to our Minds, and if there is ſuch an Object, there muſt be ſuch a *Being*, for Object and Being are all one; for as whatever does not appear, for that Reaſon *is not* as to the Mind, ſo whatever does appear, for that Reaſon *is*, and muſt really exiſt; and Space muſt either be a real Exiſtent itſelf, or the Idea of ſuch real Exiſtent, which is all one; for if we ſay it is only the Idea of ſuch an Exiſtent, it neceſſarily refers us to that Exiſtent, as foreknown by us, as the Exemplar that impreſs'd the Idea upon us; but as we have no ſuch farther Object of Reference, it follows, that Conception of it is not of the Ideal Form, but what the Mind perceives is the very Thing itſelf, immediately preſent to it, as I ſhall take Occaſion more particularly to obſerve in the Chapter of objective States and Modes.

To

To ſay it is an Idea, but of no actual Exiſtent, is to call it a Copy that has no Original. It is a Miſtake of Mr. *Lock*, when he ſays, *That our Idea's are not always the Proof of the Exiſtence of Things*, for they certainly are ſo; for could we conceive that which is not, or more than really is, we ſhould create. We may indeed, think Things to be otherwiſe than they really are, by falſe Compoſitions, Diviſions, and Modes, as when we imagine *an Enchanted Caſtle* (P. 19. *Clark*'s Dem.) *Centaurs* and *Chimera*'s, *&c.* but ſtill, all that we think to *be*, really *is*, tho' not ſo as we think: Nay, were we veſted with Omnipotence and Creation were to follow our *Fiats*, we could not Create one new Thing more than actually now is; we could only call out the ſame Things over again, ſhuffled into ſome other Shape, and play the Creators, as Children conjure with Cards, call for what they have juſt ſeen before; and were the Impreſſions of all our preſent Idea's blotted out, tho' we were Almighty, we could Create nothing at all, unleſs Power could Create beyond Knowledge, and we could bring into Being we know not what. To pretend we have *Idea's*, but of no actual, known Exiſtent, is to pretend not only to have innate Idea's, or to know the Copies without, and before we know the Originals, which is Nonſenſe; but to have *Architype* Idea's in our ſelves, or the Idea's of more Things than really are, which is to make

make Gods of ourſelves, by being both Omnipotent and Omniſcient, and to qualify ourſelves, not only for Creators, but for Creators of an Object charged with Attributes more conſiderable than Heaven and Earth can pretend to.

To ſuppoſe Space the Idea of *Nothing*, ſhall have its Vanity remarked under its proper Head by and by.

And to ſay that it is a falſe only, and illuſive Idea, an abortive and mock Conception, a Shadow only of a Thought, that ſeems an Act of Perception, but is not; and that there is no Reality either in the Thing or Thought, but all is Sham and Miſtake, is charging Nature with fundamentally abuſing our Faculties, and impoſing a neceſſary and univerſal Cheat on our Minds.

That Space is a neceſſary Object to our Minds, an Ingredient eſſential to every effectual Thought, needs no other Proof than appeal to every Man's Conſcience upon Experiment made in himſelf, ſo it anſwers all thoſe other Characters that in their other Diviſions of Being, the learned expreſs and ſet out to us the Divine Being by, as oppoſed to, and diſtinguiſhed from, Creatural; all which the Mind traces out conſequentially from its Neceſſity; for the Diviſion of Being into *Neceſſary* and *Contingent*, I take to be, that firſt in Order of Nature to us, about which they diſpute, on which the others conſequently depend, and out of which the Mind raiſes them

one

one by one; for whilſt, by various Experiment made, the Mind endeavours, ſome Way or other, to rid itſelf of the Neceſſity of Space, and remove its Preſence, and avoid it, by applying to it thoſe Idea's which it perceives, makes other Beings contingent, it finds its other Attributes, whoſe Acknowledgement are the Reſult of its particular Eſſays to diſprove its *Neceſſity*.

Thus for Example: Firſt, Whilſt it endeavours to avoid it, by deſtroying the Idea and Thought of its Exiſtence, by fancying or ſuppoſing that it is not, and finds that it is not in its Power ſo to do, that whilſt it ſuppoſes it not to be, it ſtill ſuppoſes it to be, and when it would think it *is not*, thinks *it is*, and its Attempts to extinguiſh it, ſet it but more clearly before us; for as Doctor *Clark* obſerves (*Letter the 6th*) *If in your Imagination you annihilate the whole of infinite Space, the whole infinite Space will remain, and if you annihilate any Part of it, that Part will ſtill remain:* Hence it pronounces it to be *incorruptible*, which *Suarez* expounds neceſſary by; *ens neceſſarium, ſeu incorruptible.*

So again, when it attempts to ſhake its Neceſſity to it, by change of Form, Alteration or Tranſpoſition of Parts, and can no way do it, the Character of immutable is gained, and *neceſſary Being* is (*quod aliter ſe habere non poteſt*) as *Suarez* expounds Neceſſary, *That which cannot be otherwiſe, immoveable,*

immoveable, unchangeable, ſo well entitling itſelf to be the Subſtance of him *with whom is no Variableneſs, neither Shadow of Turning*, James i. 17. *Ordo partium Spacii eſt immutabilis moveantur hæ de locis ſuis & movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de ſeipſis* (Newton *Schol. ad Defin.* 8.) *The Order of the Parts of Space is unchangeable, to pretend to move them from their Places, is to move them, if I may ſo ſay, from themſelves.*

Thus, again, when as by tacking *Horizon* on to *Horizon*, with long Strides and vain Stretches of its Imagination, without Succeſs, the Mind endeavours to put Bounds to Space, when, as long as we pleaſe or dare to purſue, we have followed it to the Limits of the Creation, and from thence thro' extramundane Spaces, and ſtill find ourſelves as far from reaching its End, as when we ſet out; we gain the Idea of Infinity, and find it veſted with that Attribute, as Infinite, relates to Extenſion, which is its firſt and genuine Signification; and this Attribute of Infinity, all, even its greateſt Adverſaries, allow to Space, (*Infinite Space*, Clark Propoſ. 4. p. 40, &c.) All our Idea's of Infinity, or our Idea's of all Infinities, ariſe from Attempts of putting Limits to Space, and reſolve themſelves into it; for as one deſcribes the Original of the Idea of Infinity in us; (Cudworth's Intell. Syſt.) *When Men going on farther and farther, and making a continual Progreſs, without ſeeing an End before them, being at length, quite weary,*

weary, and tired out with their endleſs Journey, they ſit down, and call the Thing by this hard, unintelligible Name.

Let me obſerve that *Space* is Infinite, not only as it exceeds all our Meaſures ſtretched outwardly, as from a Center to a Circumference, but the other Way, as it is infinitely within all our Meaſures, has an infinite Depth, or eſſential, inward Profundity in it, a Capacity within all our Lines, and points, that we are not capable of reaching, and leſs conſider.

We have no Notion of Infinity, but from Space, in which we conceive and confeſs it.

As we find in Space the Attribute of *Infinity*, ſo we do that of Immenſity, which is but the Experiment of coming to the End of Space, by which we gain the Idea of its Infinity repeated every Way; Infinity regards lineal or ſuperficial Extenſion without End. *Immenſity* is more comprehenſive, or infinite of all Dimenſions, or of Expanſion, an Infinity of Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, or of proper Magnitude altogether. How vainly and ridiculouſly does Science here, pretend to ſtruggle with Nature? Whilſt our Metaphyſicians, rejecting the Infinities of Space, would be thought to veſt the Divine Being with other Sort of Infinities of their own; as when they tell us thoſe Riddles of *Infinity without Amplitude*, which is juſt as good Senſe as a Line without Longitude, or a Superficies without Latitude; and *that the*

Deity, tho' not extended in Magnitude, yet exceeds the Greatneſs of every Thing that is Great, and the Littleneſs of every Thing that is Little, —— and to have Diffuſion without Extenſion. Which ſhows the vain and malign Spirit of our metaphyſical Philoſophy, that tho' it is conſcious that it has, and that there are no other Infinities for the Divine Being to be veſted withal, beſide what we have from Space, and ſee in that, yet will not let us aſſent to them as conceivable, but clog them with Nonſence, and then trump them up, as other more wonderful and refined ones, to the no ſmall Advantage to the Cauſe of Atheiſm; for tho' Doctor *Cudworth* ſays, (Intell. Syſt. Chap. 5.) *There need to be no Fear at all, leſt a* Being, infinitely *powerful, that acts upon the whole World, and all the Parts thereof, in framing and governing the ſame, ſhould prove a Non-Entity, meerly for want of Extention and Bulk, or becauſe it ſwells not out into Space and Diſtance.*

Yet 'tis not only Fear but Fact, that without its ſwelling into Space, as he calls it, there would be neither *Infinity* nor *Entity* left.

From *Infinity* and *Immenſity*, reſults to the Mind, the Idea and Acknowledgment of the Attribute of Omnipreſency, as it means Ubiquity; which Space by approving its Infinities to the Mind, makes us ſenſible of its being endued with all, attended with all thoſe

Conditions

Conditions by which Divines ſet out that Attribute *ubique preſens, ſine mixtione cum re ulla, implens omnia, continens omnia, excedens omnia*; for Omnipreſence or Ubiquity, is but omnimodus Infinities, otherwiſe conſidered, the Abſence of Things from each other, and the interpoſed Diſtance between them, is occaſioned by the Termination of their Exiſtence, and by its falling ſhort, and what does not determine or end any where, the Mind preſently perceives muſt be every where, for were it excluded, there it would end, and not be Infinite; as often therefore as we conſider what is Infinite, with reſpect to its Scituation and local Bearing toward other Things, the Idea of its Ubiquity ariſes to the Mind and Omnipreſence. Mr. *Lock* rightly obſerves the Connexion of the Idea's of Infinity and Omnipreſency, but, I think, miſtakes their Order, as to the Mind's Notice of them, and their Depandence. *When we apply to that firſt and ſupream Being, the Idea of Infinite, in our weak and narow Thoughts, we do it primarily, in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity, and more figuratively, I think, to his Wiſdom, Goodneſs,* &c.

For we do not apply Infinity, with reſpect to Ubiquity or Omnipreſenee, locally conſidered, but Omnipreſence with reſpect to that; for Omnipreſency is the Idea of Infinity, applied particularly to all Places by Hypotheſis. Omnipreſency, local I mean, is traced out of Infinity by ſuch Method of

Application to it as the *Pſalmiſt* made uſe of, *Pſalm.* cxxxix. *Whither ſhall I go from thy Spirit? Or whither ſhall I flee from thy Preſence? If I aſcend up into Heaven, thou art there; if I make my Bed in Hell, behold thou art there*, &c.

What he obſerves, That *Finite and Infinite, ſeem to expreſs the Habitude of Quantity, as to Termination*, is very juſt.

To ſay that *Infinite Space is poſſeſſed by God's Infinite Omnipreſency* (Language that I have ſomewhere obſerved) I leave to thoſe that can underſtand it.

The Mind perceiving in Space the Attribute of eſſential Omnipreſency, has thereby the Way opened eaſily and happily, to the Conception and Acknowledgment of its Omniſcience; for Knowledge (as I have in the proper Chapter on that Subject obſerved) being nothing but the ſubſtantial Preſence or Penetration of one Thing by another, that which by being Infinite is eſſentially and ſubſtantially Omnipreſent, or every where, muſt thereby every where know all that it is preſent to; and Space therefore intimately pervading and running thro' all Things, does, by ſo doing, as intimately know and perceive all Things.

And as Omnipreſence ſets Omniſcience in a clear and rational Light to us, ſolves the Difficulties of it, and makes it an intelligible Attribute to us; ſo Omniſcience again clears the Way to the Idea of Omnipotence, and

makes the Conception of Providence, or God's ordering all Things, and at once conducting together ſo many various Motions, as eaſie and apprehenſible to us, as that of managing but one; for that which not vertually but ſubſtantially, is equally and omniſciently preſent to and within all other Things, down to the moſt minute, with the ſame Facility may act and move innumerable Things at once, as one; ſince the Difficulty is no greater as to all than as to one, and the Managemement of the whole Univerſe, no more than that of any one ſingle Atom of it, becauſe the whole, and every particular Atom, being equally permeated by the ſame omniſcient and active Principle compreſent to it, adds no more Difficulty to the Task of managing the whole, than of any the leaſt aſſigned Part; and the ſame Reaſon of Sufficiency of Power, by Omniſcience and Omnipreſence, that acts one only Particle, holds the ſame as to every other, and the Divine Omnipreſence and Omniſcience conceived, makes it as eaſy to conceive the Divine Omnipotence, or how God can at once conduct all Things, as it is for us to conceive how any particular Principle of Motion can act any one ſingle Particle of Matter that is in its Power. Omnipreſence makes the Thought and Reaſon of the Thing the ſame, as to all Things with reſpect to God, as 'tis with reſpect to one Particle of Matter, to which it is ſubſtantially Preſent, with reſpect to our Soul.

And Dr. *Clark*, very happily expreſſes this Matter,(*p.* 47. *Demonſt.*) *the Supreme* Cauſe, being an Infinite and moſt ſimple Eſſence and comprehending all Things perfectly in himſelf, is at all Times equally preſent, both in his ſimple Eſſence, and by the immediate and perfect Exerciſe of all his Attributes, to every Point of the boundleſs Immenſity, as if it were really all but one ſingle Point.

'Tis a very poor Objection againſt Space to pretend that *the Extenſion of it is merely Paſſive*, for it is not only manifeſtly *Impaſſible*, acted upon by nothing, running through all Things untouched; but if ſubſtantial Penetration of Things be Knowledge, and the moſt tranſcendent Subtlety of Nature ſpeak Activity, it is all Knowledge rather and Activity.

Space likewiſe farther anſwers to us the Attribute of *Eternity*, and on that Account evinces it ſelf to the Mind be the Subſtance of him, *who was, and is, and is to come*, that Impregnable Being, over whoſe Exiſtence, and its Idea in us, the Flux of Time has no Power; for think before the World was made, we find Space the *Ens increatum*, Pre-exiſting, think of the univerſe of Things as now created, we clearly perceive it ſtanding as it did; and what we call the Creation, is but as ſtocking one corner of its boundleſs Continent with a new ſtarted up Sort of Secondary Beings; ſweep all which away again in Imagination, and think beyond the end of the World, when Heaven and Earth are paſt away

away, and we perceive it left as it was, unaffected with the laſt Conflagration, placed out of the Reach of the wildeſt Imagination of Subjection to Contingency; and we muſt bely our Thoughts, if we do not allow it to be the Object that ſtands, the *Alpha* and *Omega*, in them, *the firſt, and the laſt*; in the infinite Capacity of whoſe inexpleble Boſom we perceive all Things eaſily lying, our Conception of their primary Appearance and Production, in and by which, is all the Idea we have of Creation, and into which we ultimately reſolve them back again, as often as we think them gone. As often as we attempt to think of *Eternity*, Space naturally preſents it ſelf to us, which is our Idea likewiſe of Duration; when we mean any thing by it, the Name refers us to Space, as it Correſpondent.

Expanſion and Duration therefore ſays, Mr. *Lock*) *do mutually embrace, and comprehend each other, every Part of Space being in every Part of Duration, and every Part of Duration in every Part of Expanſion; ſuch a Combination of two diſtinct Ideas, is, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce to be found in all that great Variety, we do or can conceive.*

There is not an Object in forming a Notion and Conception of which we more baffle and abuſe our Underſtandings, then *Eternity*, or *Eternal Duration*; and 'tis ſtrange to ſee how groſly and ridiculouſly our great Men take it from one another, to miſrepreſent and miſunderſtand it; make it their Buſineſs to

fright us from all Attempts of aprehending it, by giving it the ill Name of *Inexplicable*, *Incomprehenſible*, and would lay the Blame on the Schools, and their unintelligible Terms and Definitions, when they themſelves are no leſs to blame, by propounding it to us in Words Intelligible, but inconſiſtently put together, and making it up of Idea's of Abſurdity and Contradiction. Let Dr. *Clark* be the Example of this, who (*Prop.* 5. *p.* 44.) quoting Paſſages from *Archbiſhop Tillotſon*, and *Gaſſendus*, reflecting on and rejecting the School-mens Account of *Eternity*, and *eternal Duration, as inconſiſtent and unintelligible Cant, Jargon*, &c. Inſtead of mending the Matter, and ſetting it in a better Light to us, makes only a bad Matter worſe, and exchanges one unintelligible Account for another: One while we are told, that we have an Idea of Eternity; (p. 16.) *We always find in our Minds ſome Idea's of Infinity and Eternity, cannot remove the Idea of Eternity, or deſtroy it*, (*p.* 22.) *Infinite Space and Eternity, are two of the moſt obvious Idea's that every Man has in his Mind*, (Anſwer to Let. 6.) *At another time, we have no adequate Idea of Eternity*, (p. 11.) ſo *Woollaſton*, Rel. of Nat. §. 5. *Adequate Idea's of Infinity and Eternity are above us Finites*, and tho' (Prop. 1.) *Dr.* Clark *tells us, that ſomething has exiſted from all Eternity*, is ſo evident *a Propoſition that no Atheiſt — ever denied it, — one of the moſt evident Truths in the World.* Yet in the very next Words he tells us, *that*

That there is nothing in Nature more difficult fot the Mind of Man to conceive, then this very firſt plain and ſelf Evident Truth, that ſomething has really exiſted from Eternity, for how any thing can have exiſted Eternally, that is, how an Eternal Duration can be now actually paſt, is a thing utterly as impoſſible for our narrow Underſtandſtings to comprehend, as any Thing that is not an expreſs Contradiction, can be imagin'd to be, and yet to deny —— an eternal Duration, now actually paſt, would be to aſſert ſomething ſtill, far more unintelligible, even a real and expreſs Contradiction. What Terms of Metaphyſicks are more unintelligible? What Notions of Eternity more dark and intricate than the two Propoſitions this Learned Perſon expreſſes it to us by, and their wonderful Quality? That the Truth of them is ſo evident, *that to deny it is a real and expreſs Contradiction*; and yet ſo Inconceivable, that to acknowledge it, as near to one as any thing that is not an expreſs one, can be imagin'd. For my Part I cannot imagine how the Truth of any Propoſition, can be ſo evident, and yet ſo very difficult at the ſame time, but ſo far he is right, that one Side is as intelligible and true as the other, becauſe they are made up of Terms that contradict one another, and convey inconſiſtent Idea's, that put together in Conſtruction, ſignify juſt nothing at all, but are an abſurd and confuſed Compoſition, and ſo indeed what

what he ſays of them may be true, what ſome of the ſimple Words mean, and what Idea's they convey we plainly perceive, but their Connexion and Compoſition into one, is not poſſible to be conceived; as for Inſtance, The firſt Propoſition which ſeems the plainer and ſimpler of the two, *ſomething has exiſted from all Eternity*, ſeems to go down very glib, as a notable Aſſertion; moſt of the Words, we fancy we underſtand, and they are put into fair Propoſition to the Eye, but touched with Scrutiny like a Corpſe of Duſt, they run all together into a heap of Nonſence; that *ſomething has Exiſted*; has the outward Form only of a Propoſition, in which ſomething is aſſerted, but really is none at all; there is no Predication, but that of the Subject of its ſelf; by *ſomething*, if he uſes the Word according to metaphyſical Propriety, as he does other Terms of that Science, we are to underſtand, not only *Real Being*, but its *quiddity* alſo, *Real Being*, formally and particularly diſtinguiſhed by its Eſſence (*Suarez. Diſp. 3. Sect. 2.*) which its Signification doubly requires, as its Compoſition anſwers both (*res*) *Thing*; and *aliquid*, *Something*; and then the very Term is a contradiction to his 4th and 5th Propoſition, and according to himſelf, is *inconceivable*. Suppoſing *ſomething* to ſignify no more than *Real Being*, *idem eſt ens quod exiſtens* (Suarez. 4. Diſp. 2.) who in the aforemention'd Place, tells us that one cannot be predicated of the other

other; (*unum nunquam predicatur de alio, & ſi ita predicetur cenſetur eſſe nugatoria, ſeu identica predicatio,*) *Or if they are 'tis looked on as rugatory, and identical*, and grafting the after Predication, *from all Eternity*, upon the trifling one of *Exiſtence*, is perplexing the nothing that was aſſerted before, ſtill more Inextricably: Proper *Eternity*, is the ſame with *Eternal*, which is the very ſame with his *Something*, which is the very ſame with his *exiſted*. Had it been *Something, Eternal has exiſted*; it would have been better then 'tis now, but ſtill it would have been both Identical and Nonſenſe; for *Eternal* would not have born the *has* in its *Idea*, nor the ſomething *the exiſted*; but what he here means by *Eternity*, in this ſo *evident Propoſition*, God knows, or what the needleſs Word (*all*) ſhould do there, or the irreoncileable Term *(from) from Eternity*, which repreſents the Idea of *Eternity* as an extrinſical, both to the *Something* and its Exiſtence, a *Terminus* or Period, once preſent but which the *Something* in the courſe of its *Exiſtence* which he Meaſures by it, had left far behind it, making Eternity a fixed or ratherunfixed, paſt inſtead of an Onmipreſent.

But the Doctor was reſolved to begin like an Artiſt, and lay his Foundation metaphyſically, for this his firſt Propoſition, is drawn by what Metaphyſicks calls *one* of its firſt Principles of Cognition, *quod eſt eſt, ens eſt ens, &c.* and he impoſes it upon us and himſelf,

ſelf, by learned Pattern and great Anthority. Had he left the Propoſition, ſuch as it is, to ſtand by its own Evidence, it had been better, but to pretend to illuſtrate and demonſtrate this allowed *undeniable, by particular Proof, there was little need* he confeſſes, eſpecially, ſince what he calls its Proof, is the ſame Propoſition made more identical, *Since ſomething now is, 'tis manifeſt ſomething always was.* (p.9.) By *Something*, as I have ſaid, we are to underſtand *Being*, (*ens*) which ſignifies (Suarez Diſp. 2.) *that which is*; (*id quod eſt*) the Verb ſubſtantive (*eſt*) *is*, that again always carries its Participle (*ens*) *Being*, included in it.

Suarez, Diſp. 2. §. 6.) *Habet hoc verbum in rigore ſuum participium in ipſo incluſum in quod reſolvi poteſt.*) So that *Something*, that is the Subject, and (*is*) that is the predicate, are the very ſame, and (*now*) is the moſt ſuperfluous Particle that could be thrown in to diverſify them; for if it belongs to the Subject *Being*, that is the Preſent-Tenſe without it, and is *now* Being, or to the predicate (*eſt*) *is*, that likewiſe is the Preſent-tenſe, and ſignifies without it, *now is*; nay (*eſt*) can never be abſolved from that its Time, as the Metaphyſians obſerve; but thro' all its Grammatically temporal Varieties, carries its preſent ſtill in it. So here are no leſs than three now's in this little Propoſition, that is, made up all of now's. To pretend to prove Being is the greateſt Folly imaginable; 'tis to prove *that* that proves every Thing; it is below the Majeſty of the Ob-

ject

ject, not only to be denied, but to be affirmed with Propriety; and that *Atheiſts, in no Age, have preſumed to aſſert the* contrary to his Propoſition, is owing, not to its Logick, but to its Subject; 'tis not in the Power of Words, were they never ſo preſumptuous, to form a Negation to abſolute *Being*, becauſe it turns all Negations of it into Affirmation, and we can no Way contrive to eſtabliſh Contradiction to it, but by itſelf; ſo that by denying, they affirm it, as if they ſay *Nothing is.* The explicite Terms are *Nothing, or no Being, is Being*, or ſay the other way, *that Being is not*; we found its Negation on its Affirmation, and make its very Negation (*not*) itſelf, to *be*; and as ſaying there is no ſuch Thing as Truth, is ſaying that there is; ſo denying there is, or was, or in what Tenſe you will, that there is *Being*, is affirming it.

The Author's Second Propoſition, *That there is an eternal Duration now actually paſt*, is ſuch a Medly of inconſiſtent Terms, that I do not ſee what can be made of them, or where to begin to unravel its groſs Miſconceptions.

If it is ſo true and certain, that there's an *viz. one eternal Duration is now actually paſt*, it is as certain and evident, for the ſame Reaſon, that there *is another eternal Duration to come*, and moſt certain and evident of all, that there is a third *Eternal Duration*, that is only *preſent*, and that can neither admit *paſt* or *future* in its *Idea*. What

What Dr. *Clark*, (Anſw. to Let. 5.) repreſentsas anAbſurdity,*Howuniverſally haveMen for many Ages, believed that Eternity is no Duration at all*,is the true and right Notion of *Eternity*; *Eternity* and *Duration* are Contradictions, if *Duration* include Succeſſion, or have *paſt* or *preſent* in its Idea; Eternity, with Temporal Varieties, is no more Eternity, 'tis all the ſame one *preſent*, becauſe it all realy *is*, which were there *paſt* or *future* in it, would not be. Becauſe that Atom of Eternity that we call our preſent, is inſtantaneous; we fancy that all Preſent muſt be ſo. By nicking down this grand Machine the World, his Watch, if it pleaſed God to ſlacken that Motion,—whoſe Computations we call Time, or retard the Succeſſion of thoſe Idea's in us, by which we diſtinguiſh Duration, he could widen our preſent, to what Degree he pleaſed; or if he pleaſed to ſtop the rowling of the great Wheel that whisks us, incloſed, round with it, or exempt us from its Revolutions, or take us out of it, as himſelf is, all would be preſent to us, and paſt and future no more. 'Tis we move and *paſs*, and not Eternity; could that paſs, and we ſtand ſtill, we ſhould look forward for what's paſt, and backward for what is to come. What is paſt, inſtead of our leaving it farther and farther, would overtake us, and what's to come, be carried continually farther and farther off. In all our Computations and Meaſures of Duration, we make

Eternity

Eternity our Hypotheſis, and do it, by ſuppoſing and conceiving ſomething to move, and ſomething to ſtand ſtill; for what are all our Æra's but fixed and immoveable Points of *Duration*, (if we muſt have the Word) without Succeſſion, or ſtanding *Preſents*. Did not what we call to come ſtand ſtill, we could never reach it; and did not any Period that we meaſure from as paſt, do ſo, we could never get farther from it: For Inſtance, Were not thoſe Articles we meaſure our Lives from, called our Birth-Days, admitted to be fixed, and ſtand ſtill, we could never tell how old we are; ſuppoſing ourſelves fixed, like them, we could never have grown a Day older, and we do ſo by our leaving them, and not they us, for they are where they were; if we ſuppoſed them to move, and ourſelves to ſtand ſtill in their Situation, if they move forward from us, as we now from them, we ſhould have ſeen ourſelves born a Thouſand Years hence, whilſt paſt Ages came preſent before us; if they moved backward, a Thouſand Years ſince, as the Diſtance encreaſed, whilſt Generations to come danced by us backward.

The very Word *Epocha*, by its Etymology, *à ſiſtendo*, from the ſtopping or ſtanding ſtill of Time, is founded on Mankind's Idea of Eternity, or a fixed and ſtanding Preſent or *Duration*, as they term it, without Succeſſion, a Stop and Suſpenſion of Time's Tranſciency

ſiency, without which *paſt* or *future* could neither be meaſured or conceived by us.

Duration is agreed, I find, to be the ſame with *Exiſtence*, from which, if it is diſtinguiſhed at all, it is in *created Duration*, and that only rationally, and not really; but in increated Duration, or, as the Term is applied to the Divine Being, they are both one; an eternal Duration therefore, is an *eternal Exiſtence now actually paſt*; nor is Duration any Thing really diſtinct from the Thing *durant*, or enduring, but the ſame, and therefore, *an eternal Duration, actually now paſt, is an eternal Exiſtent, is actually now paſt*; and accordingly, in the Propoſition before, which this ſhould explain, but which rather explains this, being the clearer and more intelligible of the two; it runs, *Something has exiſted from Eternity, or has exiſted eternally*, and is therefore the ſame as ſaying, *an eterternal Being or Subſtance* is now actually paſt, which is not very intelligible to me; falſly imagining the eternal Exiſtence, or Exiſtent, put under the improper Name of Duration, to be a real Something diſtinct from it, He unawares makes Exiſtence the Meaſure of itſelf; the imaginary Time that he ſtretches out under the Name of *Eternal Duration*, to meaſure his *exiſtent Something* withal, is that exiſtent Something itſelf; ſo he meaſures he Meaſure. Nothing *is*, but what *is preſent*, whatever is *paſt* is not *now*; and if eternal Duration *is now actually paſt*, there

there was, but is, no ſuch Thing as that eternal Duration; all Duration is preſent only, it is a Continuation of what's preſent, preſent Being continued on the ſame; if the Duration is paſt, the Thing whoſe Duration it was, is gone, and no more. If my Duration is paſt, my Being is over, and I my ſelf cannot be preſent. In like manner, to ſay *an eternal Duration is now actually paſt*, is to ſay, that that Eternal, whoſe Duration it was, *is*, and has been eternally demoliſhed: To talk of an *Eternity paſt*, is no better Senſe than a *paſt* Omnipreſent; and to hear wiſe Men gravely talking of the Difficulty of conceiving *eternal Duration*, without Succeſſion, is as trifling as to ſay, how hard is it to conceive what's *preſent*, without we join *paſt* to it, when the real Difficulty of the Conception lies another Way; with *Succeſſion* to conceive Eternity, is impoſſible, but without it 'tis a Conception moſt eaſie; but we firſt make Nonſenſe of what is eaſie, and then puzzle ourſelves with its Difficulties, and complain of the Impoſſibility of apprehending how it can be; juſt quite the reverſe of what is ſuppoſed, ſet the Matter right, and *Eternity* is the eaſie Conception, and Time the difficult; for think of the preſent, and we think of *Eternity*, and have ſo far one Point as it were of the Divine Being and Duration in our Eye, enlarge the inſtanteous Point we call ſo; 'til we make it Omnipreſent, and fill up Time, and we have the juſt

Idea of Eternity, and of God himſelf; for (*Eternitas non eſt aliud quam ipſe Deus*) *Eternity is nothing elſe but God himſelf*, or the Divine *Omnipreſency* temporally conſidered, and dreſſed out in Idea. But tho' it is true, that Eternity is God himſelf, yet cannot it be ſaid the other Way, That *God is his own Eternity*, which inverts the Order of our Knowledge, becauſe God is the complex Idea, not of Eternity alone, but of all the other Attributes, and we raiſe it *à poſteriori*, out of all the Attributes together. Eternity is Omipreſent, and as 'tis as eaſy to to think of a Line as of a Point, ſo 'tis as eaſy to think of a preſent Infinite, as a preſent Inſtant; but we propoſe Things upſide-down to our Conceptions; inſtead of conceiving Time in Eternity, as we ought, nothing will do with us, but conceiving Eternity in Time, and by fondly blending the Idea's of Time's Tranſiencies, its *has's* and *paſt's*, and *to's* and *from's*, with that ſtanding *now*, and *omnipreſent*, confound ourſelves with the Inconſiſtency.

Duration is, by no Means, a happy Term to be applied to the Divine Being, not only on the Account of its Identity, to Exiſtence or Being itſelf, but becauſe in the Way we familiarly uſe it of created Beings, it repreſents to us Being, tho' perſevering and victorious in the Support of its *eſſe*, as they call it, yet its Idea, infected with a Connotation of a ſtruggling with Time, as it were, and tho'

tho' ſtill holding out againſt it, yet demoliſhable; and put *paſt* to it, and we make Time its Conqueror, for Time paſt is Duration conquered and demoliſhed; beſides that, 'tis almoſt impoſſible to clear its Idea from Succeſſion, ſo that when *Eternal* is put to it, one Word contradicts the other, and *paſt* contradicts them both; and *now*, again, that contradicts *paſt*, and *Eternity* ſtands nobly repreſented by Terms thus put together.

Duration, tho' eternal, yet attended with *paſt*, cannot be applied to the Divine Being: To ſay God *was*, or *has been*, tho' *from Eternity*, is not to be allowed, could Eternity, as it cannot, conſiſtently bear a *from* in its Conception, his calling himſelf, *I am*, in the Preſent-Tenſe, is a ſufficient Check of ſuch Preſumption, and 'tis not, *before Abraham was*, I was, but *I am*; and when, *Revel.* i. St. *John* calls God *him which is, and which was, and is to come*, I by no Means approve their Comment, who by thoſe Differences of Time would have God's Eternity to be expreſſed, in whoſe Idea *was*, and *to come*, have no Share, and much leſs, that it juſtifies the Application of temporal Variations to his Being; but it is to teach us, that all our Conceptions of temporal Differences are to be dropt in our conceiving his Being, and what we call *was*, and *to come*, as to our Being, in his are the ſame with *is*, and they are all one; and when God is ſaid to be *from Everlaſting to Everlaſting*, (Pſal. xc, &c.)

Everlaſting ſignifies, not proper Etetnity, to which *laſting*, though with *ever* to it, is not applicable; but the Ages of the World, as the Place expounds itſelf, or *Genetations*; nor is it a Predication of *Being*, but of Being God, or *Being* exrting the Divine Attributes, and veſted with them; and this is not with *was*, or *will be*, but in the Preſent-Tenſe, thou *art God*. Thus (Iſ. lvii.. 15.) *inhabiting Eternity*, is *Sochene Gnadh*, the Poſſeſſor of *now*, whoſe *Dwelling* or *Being* is the preſent, *Gnadh*, *adhuc*, *adhuc*, *adhuc*, *Bythnar*. From *Gnadha tranſiit per antiphaſin*, Schindler's *Lex*.

Time, as I find, is the truly difficult Conception, and as we call it *paſt* or *future*, we have no Notion or Idea of it, but as we conceive it fixed in the ſuppoſed *inconceivable Eternity*, and by fixing and making it a ſtanding Preſent; for how ſhould we conconceive that which *is not*, but by putting it, by Imagination at leaſt, into preſent Form and Being? What we call the preſent, in Time, is in Reality, not its own, for it has no preſent; but what we call its *preſent*, is a Bit as it were of Eternity, that we are forced to borrow to make it conceivable to us; thus we apprehend the Diſtances of Things paſt, by ſtretching a ſtanding Line between them, preſent to the Mind, and in Being, and by ſigning times imaginary Tracks of its ſuppoſed Paſſage thro' Eternity, behind or before, as we are hurried along with it; we

ſee

ſee it not, as it is properly Time, but as it is immoveable Space, its Tranſciencies being put off; and 'tis not Time, but Space we conceive; by fixing created Motion, in whoſe ſolid Subſtance, unaffected with Time's Tranſmiſſions, we make it conceivable to us; but as Clouds blown over the Moon, make us fancy that we ſee it move, and not them; or as thoſe on Sea imagine 'tis the Land that whisks it by them, or that it is the Sea's moving from them that makes the Progreſs, ſo, whilſt we are carried by Time thro' the infinite Ocean of Space, and skate it on its Adamantine Surface, as on an Ocean of Ice, we falſely impute Times, Meaſures, Numbers, and our Computations of them, by ſucceſſional Idea's to its Permanency; *Space* let into its Dignity and Office, as neceſſary fundamental Being, diſingages our Conceptions of Eternity from all their Difficulties, ſets not the Thought but the Thing itſelf, as it were, in View, clear and confeſſed to us; we ſee *Eternal* and *Duration*, if we muſt have the Word, together in it, in which, whilſt our Minds view all created Things, and ſees them in it, that is *in Being*, it ſees it both *locally* and *temporally* compreſent to them throughout, or both Ways omnipreſent, thro' all their Variations and Succeſſions.

But ſee how perverſely obſtinate Prejudice and Prepoſſeſſion in favour of an *Hypotheſis* makes us, *Suarez* (*p. Poſt Diſp.* 50. §. 2.) becauſe he will have Duration to be a *real*

Something, diſtinct in Nature from the Things enduring, finding it neceſſary for us to conceive two infinite Spaces (as he would have it), one to conceive their local *Preſence* or Being in, the other their *Temporal*, yet will have this *infinite Space* (for it is impoſſible to make two of it by any Conception) from the Exhibition of themſelves, in which to us, he would prove the Reality of other Things not to be any real itſelf, but an imaginary Conception of the Mind, arbitrarily framed, only for the Convenience of conceiving created Beings in it; and the Divine Being as eternally co-exhiſting with it. (*Infinitum illud ſpatium temporis imaginarii cui nos concipimus divinum eſſe co-exiſtere*) and to ſtretch it to Infinity, is indeed proportioned to the Divine Being; but to contrive an imaginary Infinite, to conceive as it were a few Motes in it, exceeds the Uſe, and is very ſuperfluouſly imagined, could the Mind imagine Space otherwiſe, or leſs, and the exceſſive Diſproportion of the Deſign to its End, ſhows its Infinity not imaginary, but what the Mind cannot prevent.

Another Attribute of *neceſſary Being, is Unity*, (Dr. *Clark* Prop. 7. *p.* 48.) *the Self-exiſtent Being muſt of Neceſſity be but one, whatſoever therefore* Exiſts *neceſſarily, is the one ſimple Eſſence of the Self-exiſtent Being*, — one *by a true and real, not figurative Unity.*

And

And this Attribute of Unity and Simplicity, Space is eminently endued withal, in all thoſe Senſes that it is aſcribed to neceſſary Being.

For whether we by Unity, or being *one*, mean Specifick Unity or Singularity, (μονας) *the* whole, or only *one*, that there is no more or other beſide it of the ſame Nature, Order, Claſs, Species, as we ſay *there is but one God*, that is, there is no other Exiſtent of that Form, Kind, Subſtance, &c. endued with the ſame, or the like Attributes. The Attribute of *Unity*, of true and real *Unity* in this Senſe, cannot be denied to Space; or if any think, or ſay otherwiſe, let him produce another Object veſted with the like Attributes, let him not ſay there is another, but 'tis impoſſible to know which or what it is; and ſince there can be but *one*, let him diſprove the Attributes of this, or prove it to be Figment, and that 'tis not poſſible for his inconceivable one to be ſo, or acknowlodge the *oneneſs* of this.

Or *Secondly*, If we take *real Unity* to be a perfective Character and Attribute of a Being within it ſelf, as it is a Negation either.

Firſt, Of Compoſition, and ſignifies Simplicity, Uniformity, and Similiarity of Nature in it ſelf.

Or Secondly, *As it is Negation of Diviſion*, in both theſe Senſes Space anſwers to us the Attribute of real Unity of Exiſtence.

Firſt, As Unity is a Negation of Compoſition, and means Simplicity of Being, it is that way, *ens ſimpliciſſimum* a moſt *ſimple Being*, for it is neither any Part of the Compoſition of any other Thing, but tho' it runs through all Things, yet keeps it ſelf delicately clear from all Communion or Contact with any, preſerves it ſelf pure and undefiled with the rubbiſh of Nature, and Impurities of the Bodies, in the midſt and thickeſt of which we perceive it engaged, nor is there any conceivable Compoſition in its Conſtitution, but we apprehend it as all the ſame uniform Thing, without any Imagination of Variety or Difference of Nature, or Diverſity of Exiſtence, (*Clark*'s Anſwer to Letter 6.) *Space is abſolutely Uniform, eſſentially Indiviſible.*

Or Secondly, *As Unity is a Negation of Diviſion, the Self-exiſtent Being muſt be, without Parts, Diviſibility*, &c. (Dr. *Clark* Prop. 6. p. 46.)

Diviſibility is a Separation of Parts real or mental, meaning by mental Separation not barely partial Apprehenſion (for Space for Inſtance which is abſolutely Indiviſible and Inſeparable, either really or mentally, may yet be partially apprehended) but a removing, disjoining or ſeparating of Parts one from another, even ſo much as in the Imagination. One would think that the *Doctor*'s Acknowledgement of *Space, being abſolutely indiviſible, really* or *mentally* — might have been enough to entitle it to that Attribute of Unity, as it means

means a Negation of Divſion, which his *Self-exiſtent Being* muſt have, and conſequently that Space was its natural Subject; but it does not do; tho' he ſo often acknowledges it to be Infinite, and tho' he admits it to have the Attribute, in a Degree beyond what it requires, as I think; for if a Being be really indiviſible, I cannot apprehend it to be material to its Unity, whether it is ſeparable in our Imagination, or its real Unity to be the leſs, becauſe we can mentally divide, or partially apprehend it; and tho' the Doctor, in in this Place, inſiſts on the high Degree of mental Indiviſibility, and not having ſo much as imaginary Parts, as the Conditions of the *Unity* which his Self-exiſtent Being requires, and that having ſo much as imaginary ſeperable Parts, is inconſiſtent with Infinity, yet elſewhere he makes no Scruple to tell us, that being *Infinite*, is no reaſon againſt having Parts, (Anſwer to Letter the 6th) *What you ſuggeſt about Space having no Parts, becauſe 'tis Infinite, is a meer Quibble indeed, and has nothing in it, the meaning of Parts is ſeparable compounded, united Parts.*

Ib. *The Immenſity of Space (it being throughout uniform and eſſentially Indiviſible) is no more inconſiſtent with Simplicity —— There is no Difficiculty in this Point at all, but mere Prejudice, and falſe Notion of Simplicity.*

(Anſwer to Let. 2.) *There is need of Extenſion to the Exiſtence of every Being to a*

Being

Being, which has, or has not Thought, or any other Quality whatſoever.

Anſwer to Let. 1. *Exiſts neceſſarily as every* (Part) *of Space does*, &c.

If a thing is *really Indiviſible*, its Unity is never the leſs by our *mental Diviſions, partial Apprehenſions*, and *imaginary Disjunctions any more than Things* really diſunited, are made the more one, by our imagining them united, and wantonly playing with their Idea's, by putting them together in imaginary Unions; a Thing really one, and indiviſible, loſes none of the Perfection of its Unity, however mentally we may diſunite it. The Attribute of Unity that's required in neceſſary Being, need not be ſcrewed up to that Degree, as to be *mentally Indiviſible*, and not to be imagin'd to have Parts; it is enough, if it approves it ſelf really Indiviſible, under whatever mental Separations or Diſtinctions we may conceive it in our ſelves.

Unity, As it ſignifies the Negation of Diviſion, according to the Reaſons that it is founded upon, and the Circumſtances of the Object, inſtead of a Perfection may be an Imperfection; and partial Apprehenſion, and conceiving a Thing under mental Diſtinctions, may be from Perfection. A mathematical Point, is not only really but mentally Indiviſible, and cannot be ſo much as partially apprehended, yet this its Unity is no Perfection, becauſe 'tis from want of Entity, and its Simplicity, from a Kind of Privation,

and

and inſtead of *Infinity*, is compleat Finiteneſs, and nothing but Termination, and that too of other Exiſtents, whilſt it is ſcarce one it ſelf; nor ought the Unity and Simplicity of an immenſe and infinite Object to be thought leſs perfect, becauſe we cannot conceive it together, and all at once, but are forced to think of it by way of Compoſition. *(Aquinas Prima pars) de rebus ſimplicibus loqui non poſſumus niſi per modum compoſitorum & ideo de deo loquentes utimur nomnibus concretis*, &c. and we muſt both partially apprehend God himſelf, by Variety of Attributes, and mental Diſtinctions of his Being, or we muſt not think of him at all; we muſt think of him according to what we are, not according to what he is, and if mental Conception of ſeperable Parts were inconſiſtent, either with Unity or Infinity, there could be no ſuch Thing as a ſubſtantial and real One, or Infinite; nor could thoſe two Attributes meet in one Subject; but by conſtituting Unity we muſt either deſtroy Infinity, or by conſtituting Infinity, deſtroy Unity. And this is indeed the Misfortune, that carrying the Unity of the Divine Being beyond real Indiviſibility and Simplicity to Mental alſo, has run us into; for as we have naturally no Idea of a real and ſubſtantial Infinite, but what is neceſſarily quantitative, ſo that the more Immenſe we make an Object, the more Parts we mentally conceive it to have, and making on the other hand *mental Indiviſibility*,

lity, and having no conceived Parts, the eſſential Condition of the Unity of this Infinite, we make the two Attributes incompatible, and there can neither poſſibly be any ſuch *Unity*, nor any ſuch *Infinite* to have it; having no way left therefore for an Infinite to be endued with this mental Unity, or being conceived without Parts, but by Contraction of Quantity and Reduction of Extention, that is in other Words, Subſtraction of the Idea of real Subſtance and Being; we have ſacrificed its Reality to our Conceits of an impoſſible Unity, and eſtabliſh our Imaginations of an unimaginable Unity, on the Ruines of the Subſtance. For fear the Divine Being, and infinite Subſtance, ſhould be conceived diviſible, we have reduced its Idea, or truly no Idea at all, and that of all other ſpiritual Subſtance, to that of natural *minimums* and meer phyſical Parvitudes, or mathematical Points, that is nothing at all, conceived really to exiſt but in fancy and Suppoſition, or meer Negation; and out of tender Regard to the Attribute of ſuch an Unity that cannot be, have confounded both Infinity and Reality, and to prevent the Conception of Parts, have loſt the whole; to preſerve *oneneſs*, thrown up the thing that is *one*, and to ſecure Indiviſibility, have left nothing to be divided. The Name of *Unity* and *Indiviſibility*, and *Infinity*, is nicely kept up, and very well maintain'd, and that's all, for their Subject is vaniſhed into empty Cogitation,

tion. Our fond Notions, and ill concerted Definitions of its Unity, have expoſed the Divine Being to Notions of Contempt, and have made the infinitely Great, to be infinitely Little, or nothing at all; and to divert our Imaginations, whilſt thouſands of Spirits muſt be made to dance on the Point of a Needle, and the Nature of their Subſtance and Mode of their Exiſtence, drove yet farther, beyond all Imagination, how is it poſſible but the natural Belief of them ſhould be drove out of Mens Hearts?

How is it poſſible that we ſhould conceive what is *Infinite* by one Act of Thought, or one Ken of Imagination, or otherwiſe than by a Succeſſion of repeated Views and Conceptions? And where one ends, ſtretch out another, however, one, and without Parts, an Infinite may be really in it ſelf, yet we muſt make more of it in Thought, and be forced to canton it out as well as we can, as it were into Parts, as here and there, and fancy it by Terminations and Diſtinctions, and bring it down by mental Diviſiblity to an objective Size, accommodate to what the Mind can take at once. It would be no Objection therefore to Space, being endued with the Attribute of Unity, were it true, that it is *partially apprehended*, and *mentally diviſible*, for that is eſtabliſhing Unity on our Incapacity, and making the eſſential Modes of Things, depend on the Infirmity of our Thoughts, and that the Nature of Things muſt

muſt follow our Imaginations, and making Infinite ſuffer in its Perfection of *Unity*, from its Perfection of *Entity*. What gives the Idea of Partibility to our Apprehenſion, and of imaginary Parts to Space, is not Space it ſelf, but the groſſer Objects of our Senſes, from which tho' Space is eſſentially diſtinguiſhed, yet by our receiving their Notices together, we blend it with their Properties in our Apprehenſion, and impute to Space that Partibility that is proper to its Contents, in which it probably has no other Share than as by Being *neceſſary Being*, it is an Object of common and compounded Notice along with them, becauſe 'tis ſubtler than all the Sectors or Dividers, or imaginary Lines whatſoever, by which we can execute, or even deſign and mark out Partition or Diſtinction withal, and is ſtill within all thoſe terminative Lines and Points, with which our Imagination would work its Diſtinctions by inconceivable Refinements; and our fancying Part of it here and Part there, is falſe Imagination, the Lines themſelves, by which our Thoughts attempt to diſtinguiſh Space into Parts, ſuffer themſelves that Diviſion and Solution of their own Continuity, from its ſuperior Subtlety, that they pretend to make it Suffer, and eludes our too groſs Imaginations; we may as well fancy we cut it with a Chopping-knife, or beat it into Pieces with a Hammer, as imagine Partitions in it. He groſly therefore miſrepreſents Space to us, who ſays, that *Spacium eſt corpus mathematicum*

ticum quod ipſum non minus, in infinitum diviſibile eſt quam phyſicum. True and real Unity of Subſtance, as it is the Negation of Diviſion, is *Impenetrability*, that is its *ratio formalis*, not in a paſſive Senſe, as it ariſes from reſiſting Things without it, like that of ſolid Bodies to each other, which we call *Impenetrable*, tho' the fartheſt from it of all other Things, whoſe Unity, and conſequently whoſe Impenetrability, is not from Virtue in themſelves, conſervative of it, but from the Groſsneſs and Obtuſeneſs, and Inactivity of thoſe Bodies without that hit againſt them, and by being equally lumpiſh and unrefined in their Modes, are mutually impenetrable, and preſerve their conſtitutional Unity; againſt each other; but I mean an *Impenetrability*, ariſing from Penetration, when, either by ſpecifical Difference of Subſtance, or ſuperior Refinement Modes, by the Subtlety and Activity of its Nature, a Thing prevents the Inſults of other Exiſtents upon its Unity, by penetrating them, and inſtead of being broke in upon by them, not only ſhuts them out, but pierces and runs it ſelf thro,' not only their Pores, but Subſtance it ſelf intire. Thus Spirits are impenetrable to Bodies, not by Bodies paſſing thro' them, but they thro' Bodies, tho' our Philoſophy inverts their Natures, and calls ſpiritual Subſtance, *Penetrable*, and corporeal *Impenetrable*, which is ſtating the Matter, juſt as right as laying it down as Maxim,

that

that 'tis the Butter that cuts the Knife, and the Cloth being impenetrable, runs thro' the Needle, but this philoſophical Abſurdity has fallen under larger Notice, in the Chapter concerning *the Nature of Knowledge.*

That which divides and paſſes thro' all other Things, entire in itſelf, and undivided, and not broke in upon, is thereby perfectly and abſolutely impenetrable, and *one*; and if it does this, its being *great or little, extended or unextended,* having *real or imaginary Parts,* or *having none,* are impertinent Idea's, that have no Relation at all to that of its *Unity,* nor affect it the leaſt. If 'tis never ſo widely extended, if 'tis impenetrable by Penetration, 'tis abſolutely one, and its Unity perfect, and all our *mental Diviſions, partial Apprehenſions,* and *imaginary Diſ-junctions,* if we have ſuch, is no more Argument againſt its Unity, than it is againſt the Individuality of any other real and confeſſed Individual that I can tell Twenty over it; and this is the plain and natural Notion of the Unity of the Divine Being that all Men have, that the Ancients had both *Corporealiſts* and *Incorporealiſts*; by Unity, they meant *Impenetrability, Indiſcerptibility,* an *indoſſoluble Continuity* and *Indiviſibility, phyſical and real,* not any ſpeculative or logical Oneneſs turning upon Thought and Fancy. From Impenetrability we ought to argue Unity, as that which conſtitutes it, and whence we derive the Idea.

And

And Space being confeſſedly *impenetrable* and indiſcerptible, approves thereby the Perfection of its Unity to us, let Thought and Imagination repreſent it how they will to themſelves; every real Impenetrable, is perfectly one, and a proper Atom; to the Conſtitution of which therefore, *Democritus* rightly thought, having Parts was no Hindrance. If any Knowledge of God is naturally impreſſed upon us, if any Idea of him, is eſſentially interwoven with our Conſtitution, it is that of Space, there being no other neceſſary Object univerſally ſo, or that admits not Contradiction; and the rejecting of it as ſuch, and Mankind's being betray'd by Philoſophical Prejudices, into the Diſeſteem of it, I take to be the main Ground of Idolatry, Scepticiſm, and Atheiſtical Controverſy; for Space acknowledged to be the Divine Being, and Subject of the Divine Attributes, lets us into a juſt and diſtinct Idea of God, of whom we otherwiſe have none at all, for want of a natural Foundation for the Attributes to exiſt in; without which we may talk of an Idea as long as we will, but 'tis impoſſible for the Mind to form any; and what we ſo call, is nothing but a Name, and a confuſed Aſſent to nothing at all, farther than Space forces itſelf in with the Attributes, and informs them with ideal Life and Spirit.

It opens an eaſy Way, and ſimple, to the Proof, and to work the Conviction of God's

being *à priori*, by which, without the Subtilties of metaphyſical Ratiocinations or Chains of pretended Demonſtrations, that are difficult to be apprehended, and of ſuſpected Force when they are ſo, all Men may obviouſly apprehend the Object, whoſe Knowledge is the end of their Creation; it removes that ſcandalous Objection of the Atheiſts, *That none can have an Idea of God, and that he is an incomprehenſible Nothing, without Reality, a Bundle of Incomprehenſibles and Impoſſibles put together, and that the Name is a Sound without Conception or Idea to it, a Word without Signification, an* ἀφάνισον, *or unimaginable.*

As the ſtrength of the Title of Space to be neceſſary Being, appears by our perceiving in it the Divine Attributes, and our traceing them from its objective Neceſſity to us, and their reſolving themſelves back into it, ſo it is farther confirmed to us by the various Authority of ſuch as have adorned it with ſuitable Characters, or repreſented the Divine Being ſo as agrees to it, and points it out to us. Even its Enemies, that think the lighteſt of it, whilſt they depreciate it, allow it the Characters of *Infinity*, *Immenſity*, *Immutability*, *Eternity*, *Incomprehenſibility*, &c. and 'tis, in ſhort, the Light of the Underſtanding, the Scene of all Contemplation; in its Serenity, the Mathematician, without Eyes, ſees all his Lines and Figures, forms his Problems

Problems, and works his immaterial Demonſtrations, and finds him Room to ſtretch his little Infinites; in it all the Affairs of the Mind are tranſacted, the Region of Speculation.

Firſt, Scripture, under both Diſpenſations, repreſents to us the (יהוה) *Jehovah*, or infinite Being, by Characters that throw us on Space (1 Kings viii. 27.) *Behold the Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee.* (Job. xi 8.) *Higher than the Heavens, what can'ſt thou do? Deeper than Hell, what can'ſt thou know? The Meaſure thereof is longer than the Earth, broader than the Sea.*

Pſal. cxxxix. ſets the Divine Omnipreſence before us, in Terms effectually conveying Space to us (*Pſal* cxlv. *There is no End of his Greatneſs.* (Baruch iii) —— *Great, and hath no End, high and unmeaſurable. The moſt High* (Acts xvii. 18, &c.) *Higher than the Higheſt*, (Eccleſ. v. 8.) (Acts vii. 28.) *In him we live and move, and have our Being.* Which Mr. *Lock* takes Notice of, as pointing out Space to us. (Eph. ii. 18.) *That ye may be able to comprehend, with all Saints, what is the Breadth and Length, and Depth and Heighth* (Eph. i. 23.) *The Fullneſs of him that filleth all in all* (Eph. iv. 6.) *one God, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.*

The old and famous Biſhop *Bradwardin* deſcribes the Divine Subſtance to us, by *Sphera infinita cujus centrum eſt ubique*, *An infinite Sphere, whoſe Center is every where.*

The old *Egyptians* repreſented God by the Hieroglyphick of a Circle. *Lucretius*, tho' under the unworthy *Name* of *Inane*, both acknowledges its Reality, and diſtinguiſhes the univerſe of Things into Bodies, and *that* which he makes the Ground of their Conſtitution,

Omnis ut eſt igitur in ſe natura duabus
Conſiſtit rebus, nam corpora ſunt & mane
Hæc in quo ſita ſunt, &c.
Lib. 3. *Æterna*——
Aut ideo durare ætatem poſſe per omnem
Plagarum quia ſunt expertia, ſicut mane eſt.
Quod manet intactum; neque ab ictu fungi-
(tur filum,
Aut ideo quia nulla loci ſit copia circum
Quo quaſi res poſſint diſcedere diſſolvi quæ
Sicut ſummarum ſumma eſt eterna neque extra
Quis locus eſt quo diffugiat, &c.
Virgil —— Jovis *omnia plena.*
—— *Deum ire per omnes*
Terraſq; tractuſq; maris celumque profundum
Jupiter *eſt quodcunq; vides quocunq; moveris*
Magnum per Inane.

Did we think either Nature or Revelation to be Safe-Conduct to put our Aſſents to the Divine Being under, or ourſelves at Liberty to form our Conceptions of the infinite Subſtance according to the literal Propriety of the

the Scriptures Repreſentations of it to us, and to ſtand to the Idea's of it, that the inſpired Pen-Men raiſe, and own the Object that they lead us to, *Space* muſt immediately be acknowledged to be it, but forbid by our Philoſophy and prevalent Inſtitution to the contrary, we are affraid and aſhamed to ſpeak as we think, and forget that we think as we do, and muſt; we induſtriouſly conceal our real Sentiments and Conceptions, diſſemble the true State of our Conſciouſneſs, and the Form of the Object we aſſent to, and ſtrenuouſly keep it down, and fancy we do not think the Divine Being to be what we do; we think of him according to Nature, but profeſs to do it according to Art. We think of him as we muſt not ſpeak, and ſpeak of him as we cannot think, if we think of him at all as a real Exiſtent.

'*But*, Secondly, *I am to obſerve the Vanity, Weakneſs, and Inconſiſtency of the Objections that are made againſt Space being neceſſary Being, and the Prejudices that are the Ground of ſuch Objections, and of its being diſowned.*

And 'tis ſtrange to conſider what a Contradiction of Philoſophical Prejudices, from oppoſite Quarters concur, as in Conſpiracy, to ſerve as Reaſons to make Men overlook Space, and diſown it to be neceſſary Being.

For the Enemies of Space, as diſtinguiſhed by the Names of their Philoſophical He-

reſies, are either, firſt, Atheiſts, or Corporealiſts, ſo called; or Theiſts, or Incoporealiſts: Firſt, *Corporealiſts*, on their Side, judging of it by their Principle, *That whatever is, is Body*, have treated it contemptibly, and with all Manner of low Conceit, becauſe they thought it not to be Body.

Whilſt the *Incorporealiſts*, on their Side, have treated it no leſs unworthily, by thinking it to be Body, by the falſe Rule of Extenſion and Quantity.

The following Quotations, which I ſhall put down in no other Order than as they came in my Way, will ſerve as *Specimen* of the Reflections thrown upon it from both Sides.

Aug. Confeſſ. Lib. 7.] *Spacioſum nihil, empty Space.*

This is the trite, and common Reproach from all Sides.

Cudworth's Intell. Syſt.] *Whatſoever is not Body, is empty Space, or Nothing, there is no third Being beſide theſe Two.*

Id.] *There being nothing incorporeal but Space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.*

Rem.] How much better Logick the other Way, there being nothing incorporeal but Space, Space is that incorporeal Deity.

Id.]

Id.] *Spectre of a Body — an imaginary Thing, without Reality.*

Id.] *Becauſe this gives Advantage to Theiſts to make Space to be Something, or that which has a real Entity or Nature, without our Conceptions, whence it follows that it muſt either itſelf be a Subſtance, or the Mode of ſome incorporeal Subſtance; the modern Democriticks are far more cautious, and make Space to be no Nature really exiſting without us, but only the Phantaſm of Body, and as it were, the Ghoſt of it, which has no Reality without our Imagination, ſo that there are not two Natures of Body and Space, which muſt needs infer two diſtinct Subſtances, one whereof is incorporeal, the other corporeal, but one only Nature of Body,* Ergo, *An incorporeal Subſtance is the ſame with an incorporeal Body, and therefore Nothing.*

Id.] *If there be any Thing extended otherwiſe than Body only, ſo as to penetrate Bodies, and co-exiſt with them; this is a Thing next to Nothing, ſince it can neither act upon any other Thing, nor be acted upon by, or ſenſible of any Thing. It can neither do nor ſuffer any Thing. Wherefore, to ſpeak plainly, this can be nothing but empty Space or* Vacuum, *which runs thro' all Things without laying hold on any Thing, or being affected from any Thing.*

Id.] *This is the only incorporeal Thing that can be in Nature, Space or Place; to ſuppoſe an incorporeal Deity, is to make empty Space the Creator of all Things.*

Id.] *It is the Creature of Fear and Fancy only.*

Rem.] This laſt Reproach is very groundleſs, its Univerſality ſhows, that the Notice of it ſprings from Nature unabuſed either by any Doctrine, Prejudice, or Paſſion whatſoever; and Men are ſo far from being hurried or frighted into the Conception of it, that they can neither be affrighted out of it, nor in their cooleſt Blood once imagine it not to be.

The Incorporealiſts conceiving, as I ſaid, Space as extended, which they took as granted to be the Eſſence or Property of corporeal Subſtance, rejected it, not only as no Incorporeal, but as no real Exiſtent, aſſenting to all the low Characters given it by the Corporealiſts.

Plato and *Ariſtotle*, I find, noted as Authors of Prejudices againſt the Incorporeity of Space on that Account; thoſe Founders of the metaphyſical Scheme, whoſe Authority ſent it down under the greateſt Diſadvantage to the Thinkers in the metaphyſical Way, their Succeſſors.

The

The ancient *Incorporealiſts* called it a thin and ſubtle Body, and ſome attending to its wonderful Properties, tho' they could not get over the Argument of Extenſion that proved it by their Principles to be a Body, yet in Juſtice to it, formed a Diſtinction of Extenſions, one of which they made proper to Body, the other to Spiritual Subſtance: So ſaid, it was indeed extended but otherwiſe than Bodies are; and that ſpiritual Beings have their Longitude, Latitude and Profundity, or Magnitude and Dimenſions, but of a kind ſpecifically different from that of Bodies, by the help of which Diſtinction, ſome learned Theiſts and Incorporealiſts aſſerted *Space* to be *the infinite Extenſion of an Incorporeal Deity*, (Cudworth Chap. 4. Int. Syſt.) and yet to be more diſtinct from Body than any other incorporeal Thing, and I preſume, it may be under the Shelter of this Diſtinction of Extenſions, that Dr. *Clark* (Anſ. to Let. 2.) ſays, *That Extenſion is needful to the Exiſtence of every Being.*

Some of our Moderns have indeed, allowed its Incorporeity, but ſtill with no Advantage to it; as *Gaſſendus*, who ſuppoſes it an Incorporeal Thing, but neither Subſtance nor yet Accident, but of a middle Nature or Eſſence between both; much at the ſame rate the Chymical Philoſopher *Helmont* makes Space a real Being, truly exiſting in Nature, but neither Subſtance nor Accident, but of a third

Kind

Kind, which he dignifies by the Name of *Magnale*. *Mr.* Lock *thinks Space is only a Relation reſulting from the Exiſtence of other Things* whoſe Thoughts of Extenſion are likewiſe quite contrary to thoſe of Doctor *Clark*, when he ſays, *That ſome have had their Minds ſo filled with Extenſion, and as it were, wholly poſſeſſed with it, that they allow no Exiſtence to any thing that has not Extenſion.*

Id. *Extenſion is but the Affection of Body.* (2d Letter to Dr. *Clark*,) *Space and Duration can't properly be called Things, but are conſider'd rather as Affections which belong, and in the order of our Thoughts, are antecedently neceſſary to the Being of all Things.*

Rem.] A ſtrange Account indeed, that what is not *a Thing* it ſelf, ſhould be antecedently neceſſary to the Being of *all Things*.

(Dr. *Clark*, Propoſ. 4. Demonſt. of the Being, &c.) *We may obſerve the Weakneſs of ſuch as have preſumed to imagine infinite Space to be a juſt Repreſentation, or adequate Idea of the Eſſence of the ſupreme Cauſe.*

Rem.] Since Space is *Infinite*, as he ſays, where is the Weakneſs of repreſenting what is *Infinite* by it? Can there be a more juſt and adequate Repreſentation of an *Infinite*, than

than by an *Infinite*? If Space is *Infinite*, unleſs there are more *Infinites* than one, which himſelf proves impoſſible; 'tis not only the Repreſentation, but the Thing it ſelf; but he is inconſiſtent with himſelf, (Prop. 3.) *We always find in our Minds Idea's of Infinity* (Prop. 6.) *'Tis impoſſible for us to form an adequate Idea of Infinity; Space is Infinite*, yet 'tis a Weakneſs and Preſumption to imagine, that it repreſents *Infinity*, or what is *Infinite* to us; which Weakneſs and Preſumption himſelf is guilty of in his Letters, making Space *the Property of the ſelf-exiſtent Being; that Being its* Subſtratum, *or* Subſtance, *and that by being evidently neceſſary it ſelf, it proves, that the Space of which it is a Property, muſt alſo be neceſſary*, (Anſ. to Let. 3.) ſo that he makes *Space* to be the Divine Being, only he ſuppoſes two *Spaces*, one the Property, and the other the Thing lying under it or behind it as it were.

Id. Ib.] *Infinite Space is but an abſtract Idea of Immenſity or Infinity even, as infinite Duration is of Eternity.*

Rem. But an Abſtract Idea of *Immenſity* or *Infinity*, 'tis like one of Doctor *Swift*'s Burleſque, *Buts — but Saints.*

Ib.] *It would be juſt as proper to ſay, that Eternity,*

Eternity *is the Eſſence of the ſupreme Cauſe, as to ſay, that* Immenſity *is ſo.*

Rem.] And they are both very proper, I ſhould think; for what is *Eſſence*, but that which is *eſſential*, which *they* are to the ſupreme Cauſe.

Id.] *Indeed they ſeem both to be but Attributes of an Eſſence or Subſtance, Incomprehenſible to us.*

Rem.] But *Attributes again*, of God.

Woollaſton, Rel. of Nat. Prop 12.] *Space taken ſeparately from the Things which poſſeſs and fill it, is but an empty Scene or* Vacuum *and to ſay that infinite Space is God, or that God is infinite Space, is to ſay, that he is an infinite* vacuum, *than which nothing can be more abſur'd or blaſphemous. How can Space which is but a vaſt Void, rather the Negation of all Things then poſitively any Thing; a kind of diffuſed Nothing; how can this, I ſay, be the ſupreme Cauſe*, &c.

Ib.] *What Attributes beſide Penetrability, what Excellencies what Perfections is it capable of.*

Ib.] *Infinite Space and Duration, taken together, cannot be God, becauſe an interminable Space of infinite Duration, is ſtill Nothing*

thing but eternal Space, and that is at moſt but an eternal vacuum.

Remark.] Theſe are certainly the moſt unfortunate and inconſiſtent Objections that ever were made by Philoſopher or Divine.

Firſt, As to his calling it *empty Space*, an *empty Scene*, *a vaſt Void*, *an eternal* Vaccuum, *a diffuſive Nothing*, &c. I would fain know what this Gentleman would have it filled up withal, to raiſe his Opinion of it? What it is that he ſuppoſes it to want, having in it that makes him have ſo low Thoughts of it? Which way he would have the Objection removed that would not make it more exceptionable? By *Vacuum* he can mean no more than without Body, and I preſume he was not one of thoſe groſs Thinkers that take God to be a Body; ſo that the Objection is againſt his own Principiples and by a *Negation of all Things*, he he can only mean a Negation of all thoſe Things, that ſpiritual Subſtance ſhould be a Negation of. But I perceive, that your pretended refined Thinkers, may have at bottom, coarſe Immaginations, and after all their metaphyſical Speculations and Demonſtrations, groſs Conceits of God's being a Body, may ſtill lie unreformed in them; and in executing their Hypotheſis, detect their Hearts to be in the contrary Intereſt, and the real Sentiment breaks out thro' the Superficial. For to talk of the *Vacuities* of *Space*, as Dr. *Clark* does, and

and of its *Emptineſs*, with this Gentleman, as a Reflection upon it, as wanting an *embon Point*, to be plumped up, and filled out as a Jejune and meager Subſtance, is certainly very groſs Conceit, for ſuch ſublimated Thinkers. As imagining it to be ever the fuller for Bodies being in it, that have no Communication with it, nor natural or ſubſtantial Relation to it, is little leſs ſo.

Rem. 2.] *What Attributes, beſides Penetrability, what Perfections, what Excellencies is it capable of?*

What ſtrange Soleciſms are here? is *Penetrability* an *Attribute*? Is it an *Excellency* or *Perfection*? Quite otherwiſe, it is a natural Imperfection, the Proof of Inferiority to other Subſtances; or is Space penetrable? unleſs he thinks he runs thro' that, that runs thro' him and all Things.

Rem. 3.] *Infinite Space and Duration taken together cannot be God, becauſe an interminable Space of infinite Duration, is ſtill nothing but eternal Space, and at moſt, but an eternal* Vacuum.

Rem. 3.] *Penetrability*, that is an Attribute with him, but other Attributes Space has none; tho' it is *Infinite*, *Eternal*, *Interminable*, yet thoſe are no *Attributes*, no *Excellencies*, no *Perfections*, but are turned aſide, with a *But* — that's

— that's all; as if *Infinite* and *Eternal* were not enough to entitle what is ſo to be Divine.

No leſs inconſiſtent with himſelf, is the great Maſter *Suarez*, (Diſp. 51.) where obſerving from *Simplicius*, That the Ancients thought *Space indiviſible, immaterial, immoveable, eternal,* and *uncreated, neceſſary, and not to be annihilated or thought not to be*; that it could not be abſtract Dimenſion, or Quantity, exiſting without Subſtance, *&c.* and ſaid, all that Doctor *Clark* has borrowed from him, in his Letters, to magnify it; yet concludes like Mr. *Woollaſton*, that it is nothing real or poſſitive, *Sufficienter videtur poſſe convinci, illud Spatium, prout Condiſtinctum à corpore continente & contento revera eſſe nihil; quia neque eſt ſubſtantia, neque que accidens, neque aliquid creatum aut temporale, ſed eternum.*

'Tis ſufficiently to be proved, that as it's diſtinguiſhed from Bodies continent and content, is in good Troth, nothing at all, becauſe it is neither Subſtance nor Accident, nor any Thing created or temporal, but eternal.

What an unaccountable Reaſon is this, for its being *Nothing*, becauſe it is *Eternal*.

Thus Space to make an agreeable Sacrifice to fond *Hypotheſis*, is thruſt down to the loweſt pitch of Diſgrace and Diſeſteem in human Judgment; ſtruck out of the Number of proper Objects, below the very loweſt of Things, and as

by

by philoſophical Sentence and Decree made over to that Name of imaginary Contradiction to all that is neceſſary, good, or real, *Nothing*; the Hiſtory of which crabbed and troubleſome Term, every way contriv'd to diſgrace, and perplex, and beſool humane Underſtanding, provoked with this Application of it to Space, I ſhall more particularly proſecute, and trace its Pedigree.

THE